


THE DUTCH PERSPECTIVE ON NATO DEVELOPMENT  
DURING THE KOREAN WAR



A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
Military History

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## ABSTRACT

### THE DUTCH PERSPECTIVE ON NATO DEVELOPMENT DURING THE KOREAN WAR, by Major Remco van Ingen, 132 pages.

Between 1945 and 1949 a pattern of mistrust developed between the communist block and the Free Western World. To counter the threat of communism the United States and fifteen allies decided to organize a mutual security pact. With the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949 NATO was established. The United States adopted the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, providing the bulk of military equipment to NATO members.

The Korean War gave an impulse to further the development of NATO. The member countries tried to use the timeframe from 1950 until 1954 to bolster the defensive power of the alliance. NATO created the Supreme Allied Commander Europe as a unified command, under General Eisenhower. NATO also expanded to include Greece and Turkey as new members. The discussion about potential German re-armament and membership proved to be a source of tension.

The Netherlands tried to pursue specific interests within NATO. The Dutch government tried to get a favorable defensive line accepted in NATO, covering as much territory as possible. The Dutch lobbied for a blue water naval role in NATO covering the northern Atlantic Ocean, but instead received a minor role focusing on patrolling the North Sea.

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## ACRONYMS

BENELUX	Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
GOC	Good Offices Committee
KMAG	Korean Military Assistance Group
MAAG	Military Advisory and Assistance Group
MDAA	Mutual Defense Assistance Act
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MSA	Mutual Security Agency
NAT	North Atlantic Treaty
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NSCF	National Security Council File
POW	Prisoner of War
PSF	President's Secretary File
ROK	Republic of Korea
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SEA	Southeast Asia
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WU	Western Union

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### Background

On May 10, 1940 Dutch neutrality was shattered by the German attack on the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and France. This neutrality had been the kernel of Dutch foreign policy since 1839.<sup>1</sup> After five days of fighting, the Dutch government surrendered and Holland fell under German occupation. After the end of World War II the Dutch government made a significant change to their foreign and security policy. Instead of returning to the pre-war policy of neutrality, the Dutch government chose to put their faith in collective defense. The Netherlands became one of the founding members of the Western Union (WU) in 1948 and later of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The first major challenge the Dutch government faced was the revival of the economy. The Netherlands had a largely trade based economy. The colonies, especially the Dutch East Indies played a major role in the Dutch economy. Restoration of colonial rule in the Dutch East Indies was therefore perceived vital to the revival of the Dutch economy. The Dutch phrase: “Indië verloren, rampspoed geboren.” [Indies lost, all lost.] was commonly used in Dutch propaganda.<sup>2</sup> This revival formed the first security

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<sup>1</sup>Museum of National History, “Afscheid Neutraliteitspolitiek” [Goodbye Policy of Neutrality], Nationaal Historisch Museum, <http://www.innl.nl/page/14450/nl?source=ing> (accessed January 8, 2012).

<sup>2</sup>Rijks Universiteit Groningen, “Propaganda in de Koude Oorlog en tehn tijde van het Kolonialisme,” Rijks Universiteit Groningen, <http://www.rug.nl/let/informatieVoor/studiekiezers/alfasteunpunt/onderwerpen/geschiedenis/object701072357?lang=nl>, (accessed May 8, 2012).

challenge for the Netherlands government after World War II. After Japanese occupation of Indonesia an uprising started against the restoration of Dutch rule. In order to deal with the nationalist insurgency the Dutch government made this the top priority for the military. The rebuilding of proper armed forces to support the collective defense had to wait.<sup>3</sup>



Figure 1. Indie verloren, rampsspoed geboren [Indies lost, all lost]. Dutch propaganda during the Police actions in the Dutch East Indies.

Source: Rijks Universiteit Groningen Website, Groningen, <http://www.rug.nl/let/informatieVoor/studiekiezers/alfasteunpunt/onderwerpen/geschiedenis/object701072357?lang=nl> (accessed May 8, 2012).

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<sup>3</sup>Jan Willem Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance: The Case of the Netherlands* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 9.

This same timeframe of 1945-1950 saw other significant world shaping events which the United States perceived as a growing security challenge. In their perception the existence of the “free” Western World was under threat by communist expansion. The end of World War II left most of the Europe’s economies in ruins. The deplorable economy, together with the ruined political and social fabric made the Western European countries susceptible to communism.<sup>4</sup> The situation in Greece and Turkey, where communist driven civil war broke out, formed clear evidence in the eyes of the United States. In the Far East, communist forces closed in on the Nationalist government of China. By 1949 it became clear that the Nationalist government was on the losing side.<sup>5</sup> In Southeast Asia (SEA) not only the Netherlands, but also France tried to re-establish their rule to former glory. Both France and the Netherlands saw their actions as logical and justified. In the United States however, foreign policy advice of 1949 clearly shows that the State Department saw it as counterproductive to the containment of communism.<sup>6</sup>

The behavior of the Soviet Union amplified the effect of the events mentioned in previous paragraph. The Soviet Union openly showed no willingness to adhere to earlier agreements between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. According to the Truman Administration this was true for the outcomes of both the

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<sup>4</sup>Policy Planning Staff, *The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers 1947-1949: Volume I, 1947* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1983), 4.

<sup>5</sup>Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., *The dynamics of World Power: A Documentary History of the United States Foreign Policy 1945-1973, Volume 4, The Far East* (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1973), 155.

<sup>6</sup>Policy Planning Staff, *The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers 1947-1949: Volume III, 1949* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1983), 41.

Teheran conference (1943), the Yalta conference (1945), and the Potsdam conference (1945). This only added fuel to the fire of mistrust between the Western and communist power block.<sup>7</sup>

Based on mistrust and uncertainty, Western European countries decide on organizing their first collective defense, against a threat from the East. The United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux signed the treaty of Brussels on March 17, 1948, creating the Western Union WU). The military organization was led by British Field Marshall Sir Bernard L. Montgomery.<sup>8</sup> In 1949 the Netherlands became one of the signatory countries of the North Atlantic treaty. This even extended the collective defense and tied the security of the United States to the security of the European continent. At first the creation of NATO was diplomatic in nature, but the Korean War proved to be the unifying force behind NATO.<sup>9</sup> As of July 1950 NATO slowly transitioned to a proper military alliance after President Truman asked NATO countries to increase their contribution to the defense of NATO and to even give it priority over economic recovery.<sup>10</sup> General Dwight D. Eisenhower, on request of President Truman, took on the

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<sup>7</sup>Clark M. Clifford, *American Relations with the Soviet Union: Report to the President by the Special Counsel to the President*, September 24, 1946, in the Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/4-1.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/4-1.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed December 8, 2011), 15.

<sup>8</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 11.

<sup>9</sup>Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 9.

<sup>10</sup>Circular telegram of the Secretary of State to certain Diplomatic Offices, July 22, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 138-139.

position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). He was able to marshal the political process and get the European countries to commit to the security pact.

### Research Question and design of the thesis

This thesis answers the question what was the Dutch perspective on the development of NATO during the Korean War was. To find an answer to this question there are a number of research questions that need to be answered. These research questions are:

1. What were the world shaping events in the security domain during 1945-1950?
2. What was the Dutch perspective on the development of NATO before the outbreak of the Korean WAR?
3. What was the significance of the Korean War for the development of NATO?
4. What was the Dutch perspective on the development of NATO during the Korean War?

Research question number one will be addressed in chapter 2. This chapter has to provide an understanding of the actions and reactions that the United States and the Soviet Union took. This chapter will also provide insight in the United States' perspective of the security situation they faced. This chapter is necessary to understand the build-up of distrust between the United States and the Soviet Union. Chapter 3 answers the second research question. Chapter 4 tries to put the significance of the outbreak of the Korean War in the perspective of the security situation of the United States, and the development of NATO. Chapter 5 tries to provide the answer to the final two research questions. Before putting the Dutch perspective on the development of NATO during the Korean War in perspective, it is necessary to find out what the Dutch perspective was prior to the

outbreak of the Korean War. Only then the Dutch perspective on the significance of the Korean War becomes apparent. The concluding chapter answers the overarching question.

### Significance

This historical thesis provides insight into the reactions to security dilemmas of both the United States and the Netherlands in the 1945-1952 timeframe. It provides a Dutch view on the development of NATO and the significance of the Korean War. Although this thesis is descriptive in nature it may contribute to understanding how the Dutch viewed collective security. This knowledge is valuable for understanding contemporary Dutch defense and foreign policy.

### Scope and limitations

The scope of this research runs from the end of World War II to the Lisbon Summit in February 1952. There are three reasons to limit my research to the February 1952. The first reason is the fact that initial research suggests that especially the outbreak of the Korean War drove NATO transition from a political to a military organization. The period 1950 to February 1952 was mainly used to negotiate and develop the plans to deal with the perceived threat. After this timeframe the plans were transformed into reality. The Communist threat that was confirmed by the outbreak of the Korean War started a discussion of the rearmament of Germany. February 1952 does not cover the end of the discussion on German rearmament. It does, however, cover the opening stages of the process, and the Dutch view on the matter. Therefore the significance of the Korean War to NATO seems to be related with the outbreak of war, more than the further conduct of

the war. My second reason is because a growing dispute between the Dutch Government and the Dutch General Staff found its climax in 1951. This dispute was directly linked to Dutch force contributions to NATO. The final reason is because of the limited time available to conduct the research and write the thesis

Availability of Dutch primary sources is one of the limitations that impacts this thesis. Although the Dutch National Archive provided some sources, they are limited in number. This is mitigated by using as many primary sources that were available in the United States. The limited Dutch primary sources are also combined with Dutch secondary sources to give a proper account.

### Primary Sources

This research is based on a combination of primary and secondary sources. From the United States side there were many sources available. From the Dutch perspective this was limited. Listed below are the primary sources used in this research.

#### The Truman Library

The close proximity of the Truman Library provided an excellent opportunity to work with some of the original documents. Since the scope of my research is entirely within the years of the presidency of President Harry S. Truman, the Truman Library became a valuable asset. A report of Clark Clifford to President Truman on American relations with the Soviet Union played an important role in writing chapter 1. Minutes of a visit, of the newly appointed SACEUR, General Dwight D. Eisenhower to the National Security Council (NSC), is another excellent example. In the minutes he criticizes the Netherlands for not doing enough to bolster Western Europe's defense.

## The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers

The papers of the policy planning staff, initially led by George F. Kennan provided a wonderful insight in the way United States Secretary of State was advised on policy. Volume I, dealing with 1947, provided useful insights into the need for European economic revival after World War II. This economic revival was linked with the threat of communism. Volume II handles 1948. This source shows what the advice was regarding the creation of the WU. It helped to gain understanding about the diplomatic road to the establishment of NATO. Volume III, 1949, provided a view on policy advice regarding the loss of China to communism. This book also gives a good idea about United States' policy advice regarding SEA region. This is especially relevant to understand the tension between the Netherlands and the United States. This tension evolved around the Dutch attempt to regain imperial control over their colony after the end of World War II.

## Foreign Relations of the United States series

This series played a significant role to extract detailed information from telegrams and memoranda. 1949 Volume VIII, *The Far East*, helped understanding the United States' perspective about the deplorable status of the war against communism in China. 1950 Volume III, *Western Europe*, gave access to official documents that related to NATO development after the outbreak of the Korean War. This book gave insight in the official response of Foreign Minister Dirk U. Stikker. He represented the Dutch government during NATO meetings. Although not a Dutch primary source, it at least demonstrated how the United States viewed the Dutch input during those meetings.

## The Dynamics of World Power: Documentary History of U.S. Foreign policy 1945-1973

These series of bundled official documents was used for two purposes. I used Volume I *Western Europe*, to get background information about the significance of the Mutual defense Assistance Act (MDAA). Volume 2, *Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* provided insight in the perceived significance of the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb. Volume IV, *The Far East*, It provided understanding about early United States' policy regarding the war in China.

### The Netherlands National Archive

The Netherlands National Archive provided scans of official documents regarding the Dutch position towards the build-up of armed forces and the development of NATO. These documents also contained the official file on the discharge of the Dutch Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Hendrik J. Kruls, over his dispute regarding the build-up of forces with the Dutch government. These documents provided valuable insights in the official opinion of the Netherlands in NATO matters.

### Secondary Sources

Next to the primary sources listed above numerous secondary sources complemented my research. The most important ones are listed below:

*Met de Blik naar het Oosten: De Koninklijke Landmacht 1945-1990* [The eyes facing east: The Royal Netherlands Army 1945-1990]. This study, written by the Dutch Department of Military history, provides a historic account on the development of the Royal Netherlands Army after World War II. This source played a significant role in

understanding the post war military build-up and the dynamics between the government and the army leadership.

*Defense Policy in the Atlantic Alliance: The case of the Netherlands.* This study provides a detailed overview about the Netherlands perspective on collective defense, the build-up of the Netherlands armed forces, and the inter-service rivalry that existed. The study gives insight at the level of the government primarily. These two studies, together with the limited Dutch primary sources, enabled me to write chapter 4.

The other two secondary sources are both from Lawrence S. Kaplan. The first book is; *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*. The Second is titled: *American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance*. Both books provide a broader context for the development of NATO. This enabled me to put the details from the first two Dutch studies in a broader framework.

## CHAPTER 2

### GEO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS FROM AUGUST 1945 TILL JUNE 1950

#### Introduction

As with the end of the First World War, the end of the Second World War brought about an enormous shift in the balance of power. On the one hand the Soviet Union was a well-established and powerful nation by the end of the war. On the other hand the Second World War induced the crumbling of the colonial system with the associated loss of power of the colonial rulers. Furthermore the 1945 to 1950 period started an era in which former Allies, bound by a common cause, became new enemies. A growing mistrust between two incompatible ideologies drove this process. The capitalist United States saw itself confronted with a rise in communism in three major areas in the world: Europe, the Far East, and South East Asia (SEA). In 1947 President Truman decided to counter this growth of communism. At a combined session of Congress, he gave a speech in which he made it absolutely clear that the United States would assist free nations in their struggle to defeat communism.<sup>11</sup> This became known as the Truman doctrine.

This chapter provides an overview of geo-political developments that were fundamental to the growth of mistrust between the free Western capitalist world view and the communist world view, in particular the Soviet Union's. The geo-political developments described below formed the background of foreign and security policy

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<sup>11</sup>President Truman Speech to the Nation, March 12, 1947, *The Cold War: A History through documents*, edited by Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1999), 24.

decisions regarding the Soviet Union and the development of NATO. Understanding these geo-political developments is essential to understanding of the outbreak of the Cold War.

#### European economic situation and communist threat

The end of World War II left large portions of Europe in ruins. Strategic bombing left cities like Warchau, Rotterdam, Hamburg, Dresden, and Caen destroyed. Eighty percent of France's steam locomotive capacity was destroyed by 1945.<sup>12</sup> The devastation not only affected Europe's economic infrastructure, but also its social infrastructure. The outcome of destruction on this grand scale obviously meant poverty for the population in many affected countries in Europe. A report on the German agriculture and food requirements of The President's Economic Mission to Germany and Austria, provided a clear picture of the deplorable economic state of Germany.<sup>13</sup> The economic crisis formed a breeding ground for communism.<sup>14</sup> The United States of America, having an ideology opposed to communism, perceived this as a destabilizing threat to the development and freedom of the devastated countries in Europe. This is clearly apparent in official

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<sup>12</sup>Pieter Jutte, "Strijdbewijs: Puinruimen," <http://www.strijdbewijs.nl/puinruimen/resten.htm> (accessed December 9, 2011).

<sup>13</sup>Herbert Hoover, *Report No. 1- German Agricultural and Food requirements, The President's Economic Mission to Germany and Austria*, in the Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/marshall/large/documents/pdfs/5166.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/pdfs/5166.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed December 4, 2011), 1.

<sup>14</sup>Lawrence S. Kaplan, *American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance* (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1991), 34.

government documentation.<sup>15</sup> In order to counter the breeding ground condition for communism economic reconstitution would be vital. With communist rebellions already ongoing in both Greece and Turkey, the United States Government felt obliged to take immediate action. On March 12, 1947 President Truman recommended to provide support to the governments of Greece and Turkey, in order to stop the rebellions.<sup>16</sup> In this speech President Truman clearly linked the deplorable economic situation of both countries to a threat to the value of democracy. By doing this President Truman made any threat to democratic values anywhere in the world an American interest. This marked a clear difference with the “isolationist” foreign policy of the United States in the interwar period.<sup>17</sup> This policy became known as the Truman Doctrine.

In 1947 the Department of State worked on a broader program to address the deplorable economic situation in Europe. A comprehensive study was made on the European Recovery Problem.<sup>18</sup> This study provided a clear insight on the interlocking nature of the problem, the link with security, and stability, and the way the United States could provide aid to influence the outcome of European recovery, which would also serve

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<sup>15</sup>Dean G. Acheson, *Notes for Acheson speech, The Economics Of Peace*, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/marshall/large/documents/pdfs/1-3.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/pdfs/1-3.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed December 4, 2011).

<sup>16</sup>Harry S. Truman, *Recommendation for assistance to Greece and Turkey*, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/doctrine/large/documents/pdfs/5-9.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/pdfs/5-9.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed December 2, 2011).

<sup>17</sup>Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Understanding International Conflict: An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1992), 105.

<sup>18</sup>Truman Library, *Certain Aspects of the European Recovery Problem from the United States Standpoint*, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/marshall/large/documents/pdfs/6-1.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/pdfs/6-1.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed December 2, 2011).

as a bulwark against communism. In 1947 both the Secretary of State George C. Marshall and the Undersecretary of State Dean G. Acheson used many occasions to address the nature of the problem, and its possible solutions to a wider audience. A number of speeches given by both government officials suggest that there was a deliberate attempt to shape and influence public perception in order to successfully launch the European Recovery Program.<sup>19</sup>

The European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan, was not just offered to democratic nations under the American sphere of influence. The program was also offered to Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and the nations within the Soviet sphere of influence. As a response to this, the Soviet Union rejected the offer for help and started their own Soviet bloc Economic Recovery Program. Stalin also forced the nations in their sphere of influence to reject the offered program. When Czechoslovakia tried to get aid in 1948, the Soviet Union overthrew the Czech government, and took control of the country.<sup>20</sup> This move by the Soviet Union was interpreted by the United States as clear demonstration of Stalin's intent to expand his grip of Eastern Europe.<sup>21</sup> This set the scene for ever growing mutual distrust.

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<sup>19</sup>George C. Marshall, *European Initiative Essential To economic Recovery*, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/marshall/large/documents/pdfs/8-7.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/pdfs/8-7.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed December 10, 2011).

<sup>20</sup>Nye, *Understanding International Conflict*, 107.

<sup>21</sup>Larry H. Addington, *The Patterns of War Since The Eighteenth Century* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 267.

### The breakdown of colonial rule

Both the end of the First and the Second World War saw the loss of established great powers. The First World War induced the fall of the German, the Austrian-Hungarian, the Ottoman, and Russian empires. Besides the fall of the aforementioned empires it severely reduced the global power of the Great Britain. The Second World War induced the second round of power shifts in the international arena.

Three European countries with colonial empires struggled to keep a hold on their colonies. In this process there was a difference between the way that Great Britain handled the decolonization on the one hand, and France, and the Netherlands on the other. Britain more or less realized that holding on to its empire was unrealistic. Therefore Britain chose a more complex approach to decolonization. On one hand it guided some colonies towards independence within an overarching Commonwealth; on the other hand it chose to stabilize the colony first, before guiding it to independence. Britain granted independence to India in 1947 and Burma in 1948. In Malaya, however Britain chose to fight a communist insurgency which broke out in 1948.<sup>22</sup>

France and the Netherlands, however, were not willing to give up their colonies. This distinction meant that both France and the Netherlands were willing to use military force to regain control over their colonies.<sup>23</sup> France fought an insurgency in Indochina, the Netherlands fought an insurgency in the Dutch Indies. In many of the “break away”

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<sup>22</sup> Addington, *The Patterns of War Since The Eighteenth Century*, 269.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 268; J. Hoffenaar and B. Schoenmaker, *Met de blik naar het Oosten: de Koninklijke Landmacht 1945-1990* (Den-Haag: SDU uitgevers, 1994), 26.

colonies communism played a significant role. This rise in communist activities was supported and incited by the Soviet Union. By doing this the Soviet Union actively sought opportunities to destabilize colonial rule, and disrupt international cooperation in the West's sphere of influence.<sup>24</sup> Trade of the free world relied on the lines of communication that ran through the SEA region. This made the region interesting for the Soviet Union.<sup>25</sup>

Papers of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, led by George Kennan, of 1949 provide a useful insight in the way the United States view the Dutch and French actions in their colonies. Policy recommendations called the concept of colonialism "an unnatural social relationship" feeding frustration of the population.<sup>26</sup> This frustration meant a potential for alienation of the people of SEA with the free world. This was something the United States could not afford, because the Dutch and French colonies formed a barrier between communist China and the free bases of India, Philippines, and Japan. The loss of Indochina would isolate those free bases.<sup>27</sup> Therefore the United States viewed it as absolutely vital that the communities of SEA and the free world would unite, in order to stand against communism. As far as the United States was concerned, the Dutch and French "extravaganza" achieved the opposite effect, driving the

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<sup>24</sup>Clark M. Clifford, *American Relations with the Soviet Union: Report to the President by the Special Counsel to the President*, September 24, 1946, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/4-1.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/4-1.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed December 8, 2011), 13.

<sup>25</sup>Policy Planning Staff, *The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers 1947-1949: Volume III, 1949*, 39.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 35.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 40.

communities further apart. The Dutch and French formed an obstacle in containing communism in the region. Besides being counter-productive, it also drained vital military resources away from the reestablishment of European defense under NATO.<sup>28</sup> The reason that the United States' approach towards dealing with the Netherlands differed with France can be explained in two ways. First of all in the policy recommendations of the planning staff Indochina is specifically mentioned as pivotal for containment, Indonesia was not mentioned. After all in 1949 the French were already combating communism, where in Indonesia the nationalist were less influenced by communism. Second of all, the importance of France compared to the Netherlands differed. France after all is a larger nation that assisted the allies during their crusade through Europe. It had its own occupied zone in Germany, and was a more major actor than the Netherlands was in the international arena. This is particularly true in the matter of revitalizing the collective defense of Western Europe. The difference between Dutch and United States' interest would affect United States' decisions. These factors explain why the United States dealt differently with the colonial struggle of the Netherlands and France.

#### The rising perception of Soviet foreign and security policy

In the period immediately after Germany's defeat in the Second World War it became apparent that the close ties between the wartime allies were failing. As of 1946 a perception formed within the United States government about the nature of Soviet diplomatic behavior. Senior diplomats like George F. Kennan were openly discussing this matter. In his article *in Foreign Affairs* of July 1947, he identified the struggle between

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 42.

the capitalist ideology and Marxist ideology. Their relationship is not just antagonistic, but the proletariat has the obligation to contribute to the downfall of the capitalist system.<sup>29</sup> This contributed to the creation of a perception of Soviet intentions. In the international arena, the Soviet Union made some moves that were of questionable sincerity.<sup>30</sup> These moves only contributed to the United States' growing mistrust of the Soviet Union. Clark M. Clifford mentioned in his report to President Truman how the Soviet Union used two techniques to alter agreements.<sup>31</sup> The Soviet Union used a different interpretation of terminology like democracy, friendly, and fascism. Apart from the different interpretation the Soviet Union used coercion to force occupied countries within their zone to violate agreements. In this way the Soviet Union was never openly in violation of any agreement. In an introduction paragraph Clifford categorized Soviet behavior as violation of the spirit of an international agreement.<sup>32</sup> Looking at these actions will help understand the interpretation of those actions by the United States government.

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<sup>29</sup>George F. Kennan, *The Sources of Soviet Conduct, The Cold War: A History through documents*, edited by Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1999), 31.

<sup>30</sup>Although it is only fair to state that some decisions of the side of the United States were also of questionable intention. For example, the decision to discuss unification of the Western occupied zones of Germany without consulting the Soviet Union could be seen as an action that would be seen as questionable by the Soviet Union.

<sup>31</sup>Clifford, *American Relations with the Soviet Union*, 27.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid. This statement discusses Soviet behavior in general. In the introduction paragraph of chapter three: "Violations of Soviet Agreements with the United States," Clifford is not directly referring to a specific agreement.

Although a common enemy did, temporarily, bring two opposing world views together, the recent history of the Soviet Union already provided a ground for mistrust to the United States. Soviet Union's history in the interwar period showed clear aggressive Bolshevik expansion towards its neighboring countries. During the interwar years the Soviet Union waged war against Poland, Finland, and annexed the Baltic States. This made the Soviet Union an outcast among the European nations. Apart from this Russia, and later the Soviet Union, historically, strove to gain access to a warm water port facility. Since these ports can only be found in the Pacific, the Baltic Sea, or the Mediterranean, a sense of Soviet expansion always lured on the background.<sup>33</sup>

With this historical background in mind, it became apparent that the Soviet Union, in many cases, was not adhering to agreements made during the Second World War. The Yalta and Berlin agreements between the former Allies had room for different interpretations. This room was fully utilized to bend the agreements in one's own favor. With the Yalta agreement Stalin did not comply on three major issues, leading to mistrust on the side of the United States, who believed that the communists simply had cheated.<sup>34</sup> The first major issue was the case of the Polish government. After the liberation of Poland, the Soviet Union installed a pro-communist puppet government.<sup>35</sup> This was not in agreement with the promised free elections, and was mentioned as "notoriously

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<sup>33</sup>Memorandum: *Background of Soviet Foreign Policy*, to President Truman, March 14, 1946, Elsey Papers, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/4-1.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/4-1.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed December 10, 2011), 1.

<sup>34</sup>Nye, *Understanding International Conflict*, 103.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

unrepresentative” of the will of the Polish people.<sup>36</sup> The second major issue was the fact that the Soviet Union interpreted the right of the liberated countries to choose the form of government they wanted, differently.<sup>37</sup> While this clearly meant free elections for the United States, the Soviet Union simply refused to comply.<sup>38</sup> The Soviet Union allowed elections, but only after repression, making sure they influenced the outcome.<sup>39</sup> In the view of the United States this happened during the elections in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Therefore the elected governments were no real representation of the people. The third major issue concerning the Yalta Agreement was that the Soviet Union changed the conditions under which they agreed to join the war against Japan.<sup>40</sup>

The Yalta agreement was not the only case that the Soviet Union chose to give a different interpretation. A second area where the Soviet Union did not comply was on the treatment and repatriation of each other’s Prisoners of War (POWs). The Soviet Union chose to have the POWs displaced through Poland toward Odessa. During this trip living conditions were horrible. Many POWs had to beg for their food along the way.<sup>41</sup> On this

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<sup>36</sup>Clifford, *American Relations with the Soviet Union*, 10.

<sup>37</sup>It is fair to state that the Soviet Union did allow elections, but they were established so the communist parties would win.

<sup>38</sup>Memorandum: *Soviet Policy towards the Western Powers*, to President Truman, April 4, 1946, Truman library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/8-6.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/8-6.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed December 10, 2011), 1.

<sup>39</sup>Clifford, *American Relations with the Soviet Union*, 10.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

<sup>41</sup>Memorandum: *Soviet Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, to President Truman, April 1946, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/7-10.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/7-10.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed December 8, 2011), 3.

particular subject it is only fair to state, that the United States also interpreted the agreement, to suit its own policy. The Soviet Union was convinced that all of the Soviet POWs in the Western occupied zone would return to Soviet territory. The United States, however, chose to only send those POWs back that wished to go back to the Soviet Union. Unless the Soviet Union produced clear evidence that a Soviet POWs was wanted for crimes, the United States would refuse to force anybody to go back to the Soviet Union.<sup>42</sup> The disagreement was not contained to each other's prisoners. The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 stated that all Japanese POWs were to be released after disarmament. By August 1, 1946 more than 93percent of United States' held Japanese POWs were released, versus 0 percent on the Soviet Side.<sup>43</sup>

It was not just on the strategic level that both ideologies clashed. On some occasions Soviet cooperation was also blocked on the actual working level, where delegates of both parties had to cooperate locally. This was visible in the case of Korea. During the minister's conference in December 1945, both parties agreed to divide Korea into two occupational zones.<sup>44</sup> Within five years both countries would cooperate on a joint Commission to form a Korean government.<sup>45</sup> This joint commission was directed to consult democratic parties and social organizations in order to establish the provisional

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<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Clifford, *American Relations with the Soviet Union*, 13.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., 24, 45.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., 48.

Government.<sup>46</sup> During negotiations in 1946 the two countries continuously disagreed on what parties, and organizations to consult. This blocked the process on more than one occasion, and only the interference at ministry level could get the stalled process going again.<sup>47</sup>

It was not just the United States that experienced problems with regards to the Soviet Union's adherence to the various agreements. The United Kingdom had a hard time coping with the Soviet Union as well. It seemed that Stalin was trying to create a security buffer zone. The buffer zone had to limit the West's influence and provide security on their Southern and Eastern flank. It would also allow easy access to the oil infrastructure in the Middle East.<sup>48</sup> In 1945, the Soviet Union incited a rebellion in the northern region of Iran.<sup>49</sup> Deployment of Soviet troops prevented Iranian forces from dealing with this rebellion.<sup>50</sup> This allowed the rebels to create the state of Azerbaijan, which raised their own armed forces. Under Soviet pressure the unfriendly Iranian government resigned, to make way for a pro Soviet government. After all the new government was annoyed by the constant presence of Soviet forces in Northern Iran, However, the Soviet Union did not comply with a 1942 Anglo-Russian-Iranian agreement

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<sup>46</sup>Leon Gordenker, *The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), 6.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., 11.

<sup>48</sup>Clifford, *American Relations with the Soviet Union*, 12.

<sup>49</sup>Memorandum: *Soviet Foreign Policy in the Middle East*, 1.

<sup>50</sup>Clifford, *American Relations with the Soviet Union*, 30.

to have Soviet troops out of the country by the March 2, 1946.<sup>51</sup> Although this did not affect the United States directly, it was still seen as a confirmation of a general Soviet untrustworthiness.

Besides smaller concerns with agreements, another major issue in 1946 was Stalin's demand for reparations to be paid by Germany.<sup>52</sup> Stalin first mentioned this during the Teheran conference in November 1943. President Roosevelt agreed that the Soviet Union's demand was fair, considering the enormous damage caused by the Germans. During the conference in Yalta during February 1945, the attending countries agreed that the matter would be handled by an Allied commission under a Soviet chair.<sup>53</sup> The amount that Stalin demanded was twenty billion U.S. dollars. President Franklin D. Roosevelt however thought that any demand for reparation should starve Germany.<sup>54</sup> The commission discussed the matter during a five week period from June to July 1945, in Moscow. After five weeks the commission agreed on principles that would be used for the actual reparation pay. Both parties signed the agreement on August 2, 1945.<sup>55</sup> The Soviet Union decided to lower their demand to an amount of ten billion U.S. dollars, to be paid by the Germans.<sup>56</sup> The Western allies, however, had objections to this demand. In order for Germany to pay that amount of money, the Germans would need some form of

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<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Nye, *Understanding International Conflict*, 105.

<sup>53</sup>Clifford, *American Relations with the Soviet Union*, 51.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., 52.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., 53.

industry. Even if some parts of German industry were still operational, then it would only be possible if the Germans had a large export balance.<sup>57</sup> This was not the case in 1946. This meant in practice that the Western Allies would import goods into Germany, and that these imports would be exported to the Soviet Union. Therefore in practice the Western allies would de facto end up paying the German reparations to the Soviet Union. Finally all parties reached an agreement on March 28, 1946.<sup>58</sup> At the same time however, Washington received reports that there were still factories operational in the Soviet sector, producing war material.<sup>59</sup> This was of course unacceptable.

#### The blockade of Berlin

In 1948 a new issue arose. After Germany's defeat, Berlin was occupied by four countries. With Berlin lying in the middle of the Soviet zone, the three Western countries had to travel through, or fly over the Soviet zone. To facilitate this, arrangements were made for the use of rail, barge, and road traffic to, and from West Berlin. For air traffic, there was a twenty mile corridor established, that the Western allies could use. The United States based their rights on correspondence between President Truman and Stalin, from June 14, 1945.<sup>60</sup> This message states that the United States would occupy Berlin

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<sup>57</sup>Ibid., 54.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., 55.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., 51.

<sup>60</sup>Note of Secretary of State Marshall to the Soviet Ambassador, *The Cold War: A History through documents*, edited by Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1999), 47.

and that the travel from Frankfurt to Berlin by air, road, and rail would be free.<sup>61</sup> The Soviet Union started to disrupt the free access to the Western zone of Berlin in early 1948.<sup>62</sup> This disruption, although a nuisance, did not affect the United States, or the civilians of Berlin. On March 31, 1948 the deputy chief of the Soviet military administration told the Western allies that the rules and regulations concerning travel were going to be changed the next day.<sup>63</sup> From that moment the Soviet Union would not allow any more travel through their zone without identification and proof of affiliation.<sup>64</sup> Travel was further restricted on the third of April 1948. Free and unrestricted use of the corridor by the United States was denied.<sup>65</sup> The effect of this last measure did affect the United States' supply situation. Therefore, as a United States response, an airlift was established.

On June 18, 1948 The United States' commander in Berlin, General Lucius Dubignon Clay, told his Soviet counterpart, Marshall Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky, that the three Western powers intended to carry out currency reform in the Western occupied sectors in Germany. The new currency reform would go into effect on June 20, 1948. The Soviet Union responded by blocking all inter-zonal traffic, and all traffic coming into

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<sup>61</sup>Foreign Policy Studies Brach, Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, *The Berlin Crisis: Research Project No. 171, 1948*, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/berlin\\_airlift/documents/PDFs/49.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/berlin_airlift/documents/PDFs/49.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed December 12, 2011), 5.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>63</sup>The name of the Soviet deputy chief of the Soviet military administration is not provided in *The Berlin Crisis: Research Project No. 171*.

<sup>64</sup>Foreign Policy Studies Brach, *The Berlin Crisis*, 5.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., 3.

Western occupied Berlin.<sup>66</sup> On the 22nd Marshall Sokolovsky reported that there would be a currency reform in the Soviet Berlin sector.<sup>67</sup> At the same time the Soviet Union pointed out that there could only be one currency in the whole of Berlin.

By the end of June it became clear that the blockade was starting to have serious effects on the supply levels in Berlin. Therefore the Department of State considered abandoning Berlin.<sup>68</sup> In the end the advice was to stay in Berlin and exploit the “present propaganda advantage of our position.”<sup>69</sup> After all, the blockade of Berlin was a clear violation of the agreement between President Truman and Marshall Stalin from June 1945. In the meantime in Berlin, there was frequent communication between representatives of the three Western powers and the Soviet Union, during which Marshall Sokolovsky stated that the traffic restrictions were a necessity to alleviate the economic disorder in his zone. He also made it clear that the Soviet Union thought that the Western powers were to blame for the whole situation.<sup>70</sup>

On July 6, 1948 a letter was sent to the Soviet Union to state that Soviet action was a direct violation of an international agreement of June 1945. The United States made it clear that they were willing to take the matter to the United Nations, if necessary. In a response the Soviet Union replied that it was not their behavior causing the crisis, but the action of the three Western powers. The Soviet Union was referring to a conference in

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<sup>66</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid.

<sup>68</sup>Foreign Policy Studies Brach, *The Berlin Crisis*, 5.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., 5-6.

London on February 26, 1948, in which German matters were discussed without the Soviet Union's presence. According to the Soviet Union that conference rendered the legal basis for the occupation useless.<sup>71</sup> This Soviet response opened a new chapter in the Berlin crises. From now on matters were taken to the strategic level. President Truman sent a note to Marshall Stalin in which he restated the United States' position. After a Soviet response all parties agreed to a meeting in Moscow on August 2, 1948. In this meeting Ambassador Bedell Smith represented all three Western powers. The Soviet Union suggested that the crises could be solved if the Western powers would simply quit their currency reform, and would not carry out the actions of the London accords.<sup>72</sup> It was in London were the United Kingdom, the United States, and France agreed on the unification of the Western zones into a German state. As the United States could not agree on this with the Soviet Union, a series of meetings began, that lasted until September 29, 1948. At that moment, the United States decided to submit the dispute to the United Nations.<sup>73</sup>

At the Security Council the representative, Andrey Vyshinsky, of the Soviet Union argued that this minor dispute should not be on the agenda of the Security Council, and that if it was put on the agenda, that they would boycott the subject by veto.<sup>74</sup> The question whether or not to put it on the agenda was finally decided by vote in the Security Council. With Nine votes in favor and two votes against, the matter was put on the

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<sup>71</sup>Ibid., 8.

<sup>72</sup>Foreign Policy Studies Brach, *The Berlin Crisis*, 10.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., 24.

<sup>74</sup>Ibid., 27.

agenda of the Security Council. On 6 October, 1948 the United States stated its case, emphasizing the willingness of the United States to solve the issue, as soon as the blockade was lifted.<sup>75</sup> After several attempts of the Secretary of the Security Council, and its independent members, they failed to reach an agreement, which the Soviet delegation would not veto. The biggest issue identified was currency reform. The Soviet Union demanded the sole use of Soviet zone currency for Berlin. If this currency was under Soviet control, the Soviet Union would basically own Berlin's economy.<sup>76</sup> This would ultimately mean that a unified Berlin was under Soviet control. With the Truman doctrine proclaimed in 1947, this was unacceptable to the Western powers.

On December 5, 1948 the three Western powers put new information before the Security Council. They reported that the Soviet Union, on November 30, had fired many Berlin officials, introduced a new identification system, and had altered essential services, and transportation in their sector of Berlin. They also refused to have elections on December 5, 1948. While blaming the West for dividing Berlin, the Soviet Union, by doing this, had effectively created an East and West Berlin.<sup>77</sup> On February 11 the installed United Nations Experts Committee reported back to the Security Council that all parties were locked in a stalemate, and that carrying on with the committee appeared

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<sup>75</sup>Ibid., 28.

<sup>76</sup>Foreign Policy Studies Brach, *The Berlin Crisis*, 31.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., 34.

useless.<sup>78</sup> This situation changed within a week when both the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union started to negotiate.<sup>79</sup>

During a telegraph interview between an American correspondent, Kingsbury Smith, and Stalin on the Berlin crisis, there was no mention of the “currency issue.”<sup>80</sup> On February 15, 1949 the United States’ representative, Philip C. Jessup, asked his Soviet counterpart, Yakov Malik, why all of the sudden the monetary issue was not even mentioned by Stalin during the interview, and if it was an accidental omission.<sup>81</sup> On March 15, 1949 the Soviet representative told the United States that the omission was not accidental, and that the monetary issue could easily be solved, as long as the West was willing to discuss other German matters with them.<sup>82</sup> From that moment on it seemed clear that the real issue at hand was not so much the currency reform, but the intended unification of the Western German zones into one zone. The United States made it clear that there was not a unified zone, at least not at this moment, and there was no Western German government.<sup>83</sup> At follow on meetings of both representatives, Jessup and Malik, agreed on a meeting on May 4, followed by a lift of the blockade on May 12, 1949. During the meeting on the 4th both parties came with a communique stating that all restrictions imposed on traffic to and from Berlin, by any government was going to be

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<sup>78</sup>Ibid., 36.

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., 37.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., 38.

<sup>81</sup>Foreign Policy Studies Brach, *The Berlin Crisis*, 38.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid.

lifted on May 12, 1949. This lift of the blockade preceded a Ministry conference in Paris on May 23, 1949.<sup>84</sup> The blockade, which started on March 1, 1948 came to an end.

### The first Soviet atomic bomb

Since the use of two atomic bombs at the end of World War II, the United States' security policy relied heavily on their Atomic weapons.<sup>85</sup> The United States was the only country that had both the bombs and the means to deliver them. It was therefore anticipated that the Soviet Union would strive to get a military atomic capability as soon as possible.<sup>86</sup> However, the question was when would the Soviet Union get the bomb. An intelligence report from the Joint Intelligence Committee, dated March 22, 1948 suggested that the Soviet Union would probably be able to detonate a test bomb in mid-1953.<sup>87</sup> In order to prevent being surprised by a detonation of a Soviet atomic bomb, the United States Air Force received orders in September 1947 to provide a nuclear detection capability. This system was to be operational by mid-1950.<sup>88</sup> Disagreement on the technical practicality of the long range detection system caused delays, so that implementation of an integrated system by mid-1950 proved impossible. Policy

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<sup>84</sup>Ibid., 43.

<sup>85</sup>Addington, *The Patterns of War Since The Eighteenth Century*, 269.

<sup>86</sup>Memorandum: *A Basis for Estimating Maximum Soviet Capabilities for Atomic Warfare*, to Mr. Robert LeBaron, Chairman, Military Liasion Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission, February 16, 1950, PSF, NSCF Box 176, Truman Library, Independence, MO.

<sup>87</sup>Kenneth Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume II, 1947-1949* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Office, 1996), 281.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid.

recommendations from early August 1949 suggest that a good system was still matter of debate. In August 1949 the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State stressed the value of a detection system and the calming effect it would have on United States' citizens.<sup>89</sup>

The United States, anticipating the Soviet Union's nuclear ambition, tried to manipulate further nuclear development in the world by providing a plan to control this development through the United Nations. Bernard Baruch, appointed by President Truman, presented his plan to the United Nations' Atomic Energy Commission on 14 June, 1946.<sup>90</sup> In his plan he suggested to place all nuclear development and weapons under the control of the United Nations. The United Nations would enforce control by holding inspections in the specific atomic countries. This, of course, meant that the Soviet Union had to allow inspections of their atomic program. For the Soviet Union this was not in their interest. They therefore could not agree with Baruch's proposal. Instead the Soviet Union's representative, Andrei Gromyko, made a counter proposal two days later.<sup>91</sup> He suggested prohibition of the development, manufacturing, possession, and use of nuclear weapons, without any control measures incorporated in the plan. The United

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<sup>89</sup>The Policy Planning Staff, *The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers 1947-1949: Volume III 1949*, 122.

<sup>90</sup>The Baruch and Gromyko Plans for Control of Atomic weapons, 1946, *The Cold War: A History through documents*, edited by Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1999), 20.

<sup>91</sup>Speech By Bernard Baruch to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946, *The Cold War: A History through documents*, edited by Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1999), 22.

States, in their turn, could not agree with this plan. Finally, the attempt to place nuclear development under United Nations control failed.

This formed the background of the final major Soviet Union driven event that caused alarm in the security domain and fueled the United States' mistrust. On September 3, 1949 a WB-29 weather reconnaissance plane made a routine flight from Japan to Alaska. After landing a check of the nuclear detection filter revealed a residue of nuclear material.<sup>92</sup> Multiple sorties and analysis of their filters confirmed an atomic explosion on Soviet Union's soil. The commission, interpreting all the evidence, informed President Truman on September 19, 1949. President Truman briefed the Chairman of the Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, Senator Brian McMahon, on this discovery on September 22. One day later President Truman made an announcement of the first successful detonation of a Soviet Union atomic bomb.<sup>93</sup> The Department of State tracked the international response to President Truman's announcement to gain a feeling for the response to the news. A report to President Truman shows that, despite extensive media coverage in Europe, the European countries generally responded calmly or even appeared to be apathetic to the news.<sup>94</sup>

The discovery that the United States lost their atomic monopoly at least four years earlier than expected came as an unpleasant surprise. The discovery triggered a chain of

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<sup>92</sup>Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 279.

<sup>93</sup>Harry S. Truman, *Statement Announcing the First Atomic Explosion in the U.S.S.R.*, in University Honors, <http://universityhonors.umd.edu/HONR269J/archive/Truman490923.htm> (accessed January 30, 2012).

<sup>94</sup>Unknown, *Report, Foreign Reaction To Announcement Of Atomic Explosion, to President Truman*, 1949, PSF/NSCF, Box 176, Truman Library, Independence, 1.

decisions within President Truman's administration. It forced a reevaluation of intelligence estimates and gave new importance to the development of an integrated long range detection system. The loss of atomic monopoly necessitated a reevaluation of the United States' vulnerability to potential Soviet Union attack. In order to gain an appreciation for this vulnerability it was vital to compute the Soviet Union's production capability.<sup>95</sup> Intelligence estimates tried to give an assessment on the number of atomic bombs that the Soviet Union might possess. A draft report by the intelligence branch of the Joint Chiefs of Staff mentioned that the Soviet Union possessed ten to twenty atomic bombs by mid-1950. The projected estimate for mid-1954 was 200 atomic bombs.<sup>96</sup> The updated intelligence reports used a system of assumptions in order to draw conclusions and make recommendations or estimates. The system used is important because it was based on the principle that an assumption was true until proven false. The assumptions listed in the intelligence reports were not to be confirmed in order to draw conclusions, but they needed to be denied by proving them wrong.<sup>97</sup> This system fed an already growing lack of trust between the United States and the Soviet Union with a sense of inevitability. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) suggested that the Soviet Union

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<sup>95</sup>Policy Planning Staff, *The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers 1947-1949: Volume III, 1949*, 123.

<sup>96</sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff , Report (draft): *Soviet capabilities and Intentions—Actual and Potential*, to President Truman, February 21, 1950, PSF/NCSF box 176, Truman Library, Independence, 3.

<sup>97</sup>Memorandum: *A Basis for Estimating Maximum Soviet Capabilities for Atomic Warfare*, to Mr. Robert LeBaron, Chairman, Military Liasion Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission, February 16, 1950, PSF, NSCF Box 176, Truman Library, Independence, 2.

might be working on a hydrogen bomb.<sup>98</sup> This would mean that the destructive power of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons would surpass that of the United States. In an attempt to stay ahead of the Soviet Union, President Truman ordered the development of a hydrogen bomb on January 30, 1950.

The accidental discovery of the detonation brought attention back to the long range detection system. As a result of the discovery the director of the CIA, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, advised President Truman to reevaluate the long range detection system. He suggested that the system should be able to answer a broader intelligence requirement.<sup>99</sup> According to him the detection system should be able to tell the time and location of the explosion, the type of weapon, and the location of the production facility. However the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed on January 20, 1950, that the production rate was the pivotal piece of intelligence.<sup>100</sup> They ordered the Research and Development Board to work out the needed equipment to accomplish this task.

#### Mao and the proclamation of the People's Republic of China

As the United States tried to contain the spread of communism in Europe between 1945-1949, communism was spreading rapidly in China. After World War II ended, a civil war broke out between the Nationalist government, led by Chiang Kai Shek, and the Chinese Communist Party, led by Mao Zedong in 1946. During this civil war, the United

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<sup>98</sup> Addington, *The Patterns of War Since The Eighteenth Century*, 270.

<sup>99</sup> Condit, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 282.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

States supported the nationalist government with supplies, advisors, and money.<sup>101</sup> Given the proclaimed Truman doctrine, the United States tried to deal with the containment of communism in the Far East. To what extent the United States was willing to, or should, get actively involved in the civil war in China, was the biggest policy question for the United States government. The United States had to balance the practicality of the Truman doctrine with other economic and security priorities, without taking ownership of the Chinese struggle against communism.

At first the nationalist government seemed very successful in defeating the communist revolutionary movement. The nationalist government however, was not able to sustain its successful operations. As of 1948 the tide started to turn in favor of the communists. The United States monitored the situation through their diplomatic apparatus in China. On Aug 10, 1949 United States' ambassador to China, John Leighton Stuart, sent a telegram to Secretary State, reporting on the overall deteriorating situation in China.<sup>102</sup> In this telegram he gave a comprehensive account of the situation. He stated that the communists were winning, the inflation was unstoppable, and that the population was tired after years of war. He ended his telegram by alerting the United States' government to the growing willingness of nationalists to form a coalition with the communists and cooperate.<sup>103</sup> The significance of this telegram is not just the report on

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<sup>101</sup> Acheson on the Communist Triumph in China, 1949, *The Cold War: A History through documents*, edited by Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1999), 52.

<sup>102</sup> Schlesinger, *The dynamics of World Power, Volume 4*, 151.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 152

the situation, but it also gave a policy recommendation to Secretary Marshall.<sup>104</sup> Ambassador Stuart recommends that United States' policy ought to state clearly that the United States did not support cooperation with the communist party. Secretary Marshall followed this advice when he issued a new policy directive two days later.<sup>105</sup> The diplomatic challenge the United States faced was balancing support to the losing nationalist government on one hand, while not getting directly involved in the conflict on the other. The effort to find that balance is evident in a policy review by the Department of State in October 1949. This review states that the United States could not and would not directly be involved, nor be responsible. The United States government would however support the nationalist government in an attempt to stabilize the economy. It also shows doubt whether it would even be possible to alter the course. On one side the policy review states that stemming the communist tide would de facto mean that the United States would have to take over completely from the nationalist government. However, on the other side that same review states that "present developments" make it unlikely that United States aid could alter the situation.<sup>106</sup> By the end of 1948 the United States started to give up hope that the nationalist government could stem the rise of communism. As a result of the deteriorating circumstances for the nationalist government, Chiang Kai Shek made personal appeals to President Truman, to provide increased aid to his noble cause as a fellow guardian of the free world.<sup>107</sup> He even tried to

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<sup>104</sup>Ibid.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid., 153.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid., 154.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., 155.

pressure President Truman by stating that the Soviet Union was supporting Mao Zedong.<sup>108</sup>

In 1949, not only the military situation continued to deteriorate, but also the unity within the nationalist faction started to disintegrate.<sup>109</sup> The Nationalist government started to splinter into two groups. A continental based nationalist representation of government, formed by General Pai and President Li, and Taiwan based representatives, led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. Both parties could not agree on a defensive strategy. This added to the downfall of the Nationalist government.

In July 1949 the new Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, wrote a letter of transmittal for United States State Department “White Paper” on China. This document served partly as a justification of United States’ foreign policy on China. He identified that the United States had three options in regards to China. The first option was to leave the Chinese to deal with the communist threat themselves. Next he argued that the United States could have chosen a large, full scale military intervention. The last option was to provide support to the nationalist wherever they could, while preventing all out civil war. Secretary Acheson justified foreign policy by stating that the first option, although practically possible, was abandonment of the United States’ international responsibility. The second option was not realistic. By providing this analysis, Secretary Acheson justified United States foreign policy and that it was within reasonable limits of its

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<sup>108</sup>Ibid.

<sup>109</sup>Telegram: Strong to Secretary of State, 7 November 1949, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1949, Volume VIII, The Far East: China*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972), 893.

capabilities.<sup>110</sup> When Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, United States foreign policy came under fire.<sup>111</sup> In this case President Truman demonstrated that even with a doctrine against the spread of communism, the United States' government was not willing to combat communism at every price. Therefore the communist victory in China was a political disaster.<sup>112</sup>

### Conclusion

The events described above formed the security domain in which the free world led by the United States tried to contain communism. Between 1945 and 1950 a pattern developed that fed the growth of mistrust between the two ideological blocks. In 1947, the United States believed that the best way towards containment was mainly economic focused. This was mainly based on George Kennan's account of the nature of Soviet behavior. This belief slowly eroded as the Soviet Union demonstrated that it was an untrustworthy partner in the international arena. Events in 1949 seemed to be pivotal to create a sense of urgency if the United States and its allies wished to survive and uphold democracy and capitalism. In that year the United States learned that the proclamation of the Truman doctrine in itself was not enough to safeguard China against the fall to communism. In that same year the Soviet Union exploded their first atomic bomb, four

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<sup>110</sup>Secretary of State Acheson's Letter of Transmittal for U.S. State Department "White Paper" on China, July 30, 1949, *The Cold War: A History through documents*, edited by Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1999), 55.

<sup>111</sup>Ibid., 53.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., 52.

years ahead of estimated timelines. At that time it looked like the United States and its allies were about to lose the race against the spread of communism.

The perception of the security situation had an effect on the National Security Council (NSC). Until 1949 United States' policy for containing communism was particularly based on political and an economic based approached. The views of George Kennan, head of the Policy Planning Staff and previous ambassador to the Soviet Union had large influence on this primarily political and economic policy toward the Soviet Union.<sup>113</sup> The loss of nuclear monopoly in combination with the loss of China to communism drove the NSC to create a new report that would influence future foreign and security policy. In April 1950 the NSC presented their report NSC 68. Prior to this report the security policy towards the Soviet Union was mainly economic and political focused, although it did have military elements as well. This report took the policy towards communism into the military domain. Instead of portraying the Soviet Union as war weary and only interested in their own defense, the author of NSC 68, The new head of the Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze, described the Soviet Union as an expansionist country with a large conventional and, now also, nuclear capability.<sup>114</sup> NSC 68 gave President Truman four courses of action: continuation of current policies, isolation, war, and finally a more rapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength of the free

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<sup>113</sup>Richard L. Kugler, *Laying the Foundations: The Evolution of NATO in the 1950s* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publication, 1990), 51.

<sup>114</sup>NSC-68: American Cold War Strategy, 1950, *The Cold War: A History through documents*, edited by Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1999), 66.

world.<sup>115</sup> Because of this depiction of the Soviet Union, an increase of military capabilities of the free world was vital. In order to do that NSC 68 recommended a substantial increase in military expenditure, economic assistance to allies, increase of taxes, and a priority of military programs over non-military programs. It basically recommended that the United States should re-arm and act as if it was at war already to increase the production of military equipment and supplies. Failing to act would place the United States at grave danger.<sup>116</sup>

The economic recovery, important to stop communism, was simply not quick enough to stabilize all European nations. To make things worse the Dutch and French were trying to regain control of their colonies in SEA, only making those areas even more receptive to communism. These conditions formed the United States' paradigm when the Korean War surprised the world.

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<sup>115</sup>National Security Council, *A report to the National Security Council: NSC-68*, April 12, 1950, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed January 15, 2012), 44.

<sup>116</sup>Ibid., 66.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO 1949-1950

#### Introduction

The world shaping events that are described in chapter two form the background in which the “free” western world established two organizations for its collective defense against the Soviet Union. The first organization was the Western Union, without the United States as a member. The second was NATO, with the United States as a member. This chapter provides insights on the Dutch perspective on NATO development prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, the development of the Western Union, and how the United States perceived the concept of collective defense. It then describes the development of NATO, in particular the unique challenges that NATO brought to the United States. This is relevant because the United States was aware that the alliance would rely heavily on its aid and military might. The chapter finishes with the Dutch perspective during the same timeframe.

#### The United States, Western Union, and Collective Defense

In 1947 five European countries debated the necessity of a collective security organization. The United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries started to do the preliminary work. This lengthy process was expedited when the Soviet Union took over control in Czechoslovakia in February 1948.<sup>117</sup> To the Dutch public the action of the

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<sup>117</sup>The Treaty of Brussels, 1948, *The Cold War: A History through documents*, edited by Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1999), 43.

Soviet Union demonstrated that a divide between East and West was unavoidable.<sup>118</sup> The Berlin blockade, later that year, only reinforced this feeling. On March 17, 1948 five countries signed the treaty of Brussels, creating the Western Union (WU). A unique element of the Brussels Treaty was the construct of guaranteed mutual assistance in the event of an attack on one member.<sup>119</sup> Officially the treaty mentioned Germany as the supposed future enemy; however, it was apparent that the Soviet Union was the real potential enemy.<sup>120</sup> Although the WU demonstrated European resolve to the outside world, the WU had internal challenges due to specific national interests of its members. France, for example, had to deliver the preponderance of the continental based land forces, but was already committed in Indochina, and feared British domination within the WU.<sup>121</sup>

At the end of a conference on Germany in London in December 1947, British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, approached Secretary Marshall to discuss some topics. In Secretary Marshall's hotel Minister Bevin introduced the idea of the WU to Secretary Marshall.<sup>122</sup> During this conversation Minister Bevin mentioned that he envisioned, and preferred the creation of a collective defense organization with close ties to the United States and Canada, giving the organization an Atlantic character. At this particular time

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<sup>118</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 16.

<sup>119</sup>Excerpts from the Treaty of Brussels, March 17, 1948, *The Cold War: A History through documents*, edited by Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1999), 43.

<sup>120</sup>Ibid.

<sup>121</sup>Kaplan, *American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance*, 14.

<sup>122</sup>Ibid., 22.

the conversation caught Secretary Marshall unprepared, but it introduced a new topic for the diplomatic agenda of the United States.<sup>123</sup> With the Brussels Treaty signed the Department of State formulated policy on the matter. A working document of the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff provided useful insights into the line of thought. The Policy Planning Staff recommended that the United States does not become a member of the WU.<sup>124</sup> Consults by the United States should provide a better understanding of the WU members' willingness to extend the number of members. The United States' aim should then be to incorporate the WU into a larger security organization with a North Atlantic focus.<sup>125</sup> If the five signatory nations of the Brussels Treaty responded positively, President Truman could make a public statement on the United States' intentions regarding the WU. The statement should contain the message that, although not a member, the United States did support the general principle of collective defense.<sup>126</sup>

#### Standing up of NATO

The working paper of the planning staff shows the United States' interest in the concept of collective defense of the Western sphere of influence against potential Soviet Union aggression. However, this did not mean that the United States' government could

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<sup>123</sup>Ibid.

<sup>124</sup>Working Paper regarding the Western union and related problems, April 2, 1948, *The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers 1947-1949: Volume II, 1948*, edited by Policy Planning Staff (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1983), 169.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid.

<sup>126</sup>Ibid., 167.

embark on negotiations to become a member of the WU itself. President Truman faced a number of specific challenges due to internal legislation of the United States. President Truman first needed congressional support to open diplomatic negotiations with the five WU members. Looming in the background was the fact that the Democratic party did not have a majority in the Senate. President Truman and Secretary Marshall asked Undersecretary of State Lovett to negotiate with the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Arthur H. Vandenberg.<sup>127</sup> Republican Senator Vandenberg's main concerns were twofold. First of all, he demanded that the constitutional right of Congress to declare war was respected in a future defense organization. Second of all, Senator Vandenberg demanded that a future defense organization should be in accordance with the Charter of the UN.<sup>128</sup> As a result of this internal political debate between Undersecretary Lovett and Senator Vandenberg, Vandenberg proposed a resolution, Senate resolution 239, which passed in the Senate on June 11, 1948. This resolution provided guidelines for the government regarding negotiations for a North Atlantic defense organization.<sup>129</sup>

The demand to respect congressional power to declare war formed an obstacle in regards to article four of the actual Brussels Treaty. The article states that an attack on any WU member would automatically result in support of the other members with "all

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<sup>127</sup> Kaplan, *American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance*, 26.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Working paper, The Position of the United States with Respect to Support for Western Union, *The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers: Volume II*, 173.

military and other aid and assistance in their power.”<sup>130</sup> De facto this meant that an attack on one member automatically resulted in war with the other members. The automatic assistance to WU’s member states in case of an attack was in violation of the Constitution of the United States.<sup>131</sup> This meant that future membership of a North Atlantic defense organization could only be realized if the treaty enabled that Congress somehow retained the power to declare war. This on the other hand worried the European nations, because it seemed a weaker form of assured United States’ commitment in case of an attack by the Soviet Union.<sup>132</sup> George Kennan managed to formulate Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter in such a way that it was acceptable for both the United States and its Western European Allies.<sup>133</sup>

The demand that a future treaty had to be in accordance with the UN was another challenge. This meant that a future treaty had to be in accordance with either article 53, 54 or article 51 of the UN Charter. Complying with both article 53 and 54 meant that the defense organization was required to inform and get authorization from the UNSC.<sup>134</sup> With the Soviet Union as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), this was unacceptable. The veto right of the Soviet Union would compromise the purpose of the collective defense organization. This meant that the only article that

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<sup>130</sup>Excerpts from the Treaty of Brussels, March 17, 1948, *The Cold War*, Judge and Langdon, 43.

<sup>131</sup>Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United*, 4.

<sup>132</sup>Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States In world Affairs 1949* (New York; Harper & Brothers, 1950), 136.

<sup>133</sup>Ibid.

<sup>134</sup>Kaplan, *American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance*, 26.

the future organization could adhere to was article 51. Article 51 of the UN Charter was the right for individual or collective defense.<sup>135</sup> Complying with this article was enough to satisfy the United States Senate, and get Resolution 239 passed. This cleared the way to start a formal diplomatic dialogue on the creation and membership of a WU-like organization, and eventually the signing of the North Atlantic treaty on April 4, 1949. According to the Senate foreign Relations Committee NATO would not only provide collective security to the North Atlantic area, but also create a “favorable climate towards progressively closer European integration.”<sup>136</sup>

Realizing that the United States was already investing heavily in Western Europe, and would once more be the predominant provider in the new organization, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee maintained an interest in the development of NATO because United States’ budget needed to be made available in support of the European allies. Hence the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was only willing to release Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) funds on two conditions. First, a proper organizational structure needed to be created. Second, a strategic concept was required.<sup>137</sup>

The NATO countries agreed on the organizational structure in September 1949.<sup>138</sup> The members adopted a hierarchical structure in which the North Atlantic Council, comprised of the foreign ministers of NATO countries, provided overall strategic guidance. Under the council there would be a Defense Committee, consisting of the

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<sup>135</sup>Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United*, 3.

<sup>136</sup>Stebbins, *The United States In World Affairs 1949*, 111.

<sup>137</sup>Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United*, 6.

<sup>138</sup>Stebbins, *The United States In world Affairs 1949*, 139.

ministers of defense of the member countries, and a Military Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the respective armed forces. In order to facilitate the work of the Military Committee, and to provide continuity within the organization, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States formed a Standing Group. The actual detailed defense planning was to be provided by five Regional Planning Groups.<sup>139</sup> During the Council's second meeting in November 1949, a Military Production and Supply board, and a Defense Finance and Economic Committee were added in the following four weeks.<sup>140</sup> The declaration of the People's Republic of China, and the detonation of the Soviet Union's first atomic bomb sped up an otherwise lengthy diplomatic process.<sup>141</sup>

The second requirement before MDAP funds would be made available was the development of a strategic concept for the North Atlantic area. In order to fulfill this requirement the Standing group came up with their first Strategy document, "The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area," on October 10, 1949.<sup>142</sup> The achievement to come up with a strategic concept in such a short time was remarkable, when put in the light of WU's examples. Earlier in 1949, Field Marshall Montgomery attempted to develop a military strategy for the WU area. This provided

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<sup>139</sup>Ibid.

<sup>140</sup>Ibid., 141.

<sup>141</sup>Kaplan, *American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance*, 49

<sup>142</sup>Dr. Gregory, W. Pedlow, NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969, NATO website, <http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf> (accessed March 11, 2012).

useful insights in the process of trying to get member countries to agree. The necessity to put collective interest ahead of national interest proved difficult.<sup>143</sup>

The developed strategic concept identified four different roles. The United States was to provide nuclear strategic bombing capabilities, The sea lines of communications were to be secured by the United States, Canada, and the WU countries that bordered the Atlantic Area from the East. The European countries on the continent were responsible for providing the preponderance of the ground forces to counter a Soviet attack, while France and the United Kingdom provided tactical bombardments.<sup>144</sup> With France being the largest country on the European mainland, the bulk of the ground forces would come from them.

After staffing the concept through the different committees, it was finally approved by The North Atlantic Council on January 6, 1950.<sup>145</sup> This enabled President Truman to approve the Strategic Concept on January 27, 1950. The presidential approval cleared the way for congress to free up funds and actually start the MDAP. On the same day, the first bilateral agreements between the United States and eight NATO countries were signed in Washington D.C., activating MDAP.

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<sup>143</sup>Stebbins, *The United States In world Affairs 1949*, 138-139.

<sup>144</sup>Ibid., 143.

<sup>145</sup>Ibid.

## Dutch perception of security and the development of NATO

### The road to Indonesian independence

After the liberation of the Netherlands at the end of World War II the Dutch faced two major security challenges. For the reestablishment of the Netherlands armed forces, the Dutch government had to choose between either regaining control over the Dutch East Indies or the establishment of armed forces that could contribute to European security.<sup>146</sup> With the end of World War II violence started to erupt in the East Indies. A nationalist movement proclaimed a republic in the Dutch East Indies on August 17, 1945, after Japan capitulated in the Far East. Since the Netherlands needed to regenerate their ruined economy, the Dutch perceived the rebellion in the Dutch East Indies as a major threat to their economic recovery.<sup>147</sup> For this reason, the Dutch government made the reestablishment of colonial rule a top priority for the newly created Netherlands armed forces.<sup>148</sup>

British forces from South Eastern Command arrived first in the Dutch East Indies after Japan's capitulation.<sup>149</sup> This allowed the Netherlands to build up forces. British troops tried to control the repatriation of Japanese units after their capitulation. This mission slowly turned toward securing Dutch residents against nationalist violence. In an

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<sup>146</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 9.

<sup>147</sup>Robert J. McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-1949* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 39.

<sup>148</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 26.

<sup>149</sup>Cornelis W.A.J. van Dijk, "American Political Intervention in the Conflict in the Dutch East Indies 1945-1949" (Master's Thesis, U.S. Army CGSC, Leavenworth, 2009), 1.

attempt to prevent a rise in violence the British commander, Lord Louis F.A.V.N.G. Mountbatten, would not allow the first Dutch troops to disembark in October 1945.<sup>150</sup> Instead, the British tried to get the Netherlands to open negotiations with the Nationalists. Since this de facto implied recognition of the Republic of Indonesia, the Dutch representative, Van der Plas, refused to do so.<sup>151</sup> The difference of opinion between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands created tension that slowly grew.<sup>152</sup> As of December 1945, Dutch units started to arrive in the Dutch East Indies. These units took over the duties of the British forces. In March 1946, the first Dutch brigades arrived. By the end of 1946 the British forces left the Dutch East Indies.

Both 1946 and the first half of 1947 saw an increase in Nationalist resolve, and Dutch military action. On March 25, 1947, after lengthy negotiations between representatives of the Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch government, the Lingadjatti Agreement was signed.<sup>153</sup> This agreement created a union between the United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands. The agreement provided both parties with much room for interpretation. In June 1947 the Nationalists refused the Dutch interpretation of the Lingadjatti Agreement. With Dutch troops pouring into the Indies from March 1946 on, the Dutch government decided to conduct a “so called Police Action.”<sup>154</sup> On July 21,

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<sup>150</sup>Ibid., 36.

<sup>151</sup>Ibid., 30.

<sup>152</sup>Ibid., 40.

<sup>153</sup>McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War*, 151.

<sup>154</sup>Dijk, “American Political Intervention in the Conflict in the Dutch East Indies 1945-1949,” 49. Dutch troop strength had increased to 44,000 KNIL (Royal Dutch Indies Army) troops, 5,000 Marines, and 70,000 Army.

1947, Operation Product started. Although Dutch military objectives were limited, it was a clear escalation of the conflict. Australia and India, concerned with Dutch escalation, threatened to bring the issue to the UNSC. This presented a challenge for the United States. It implied that it could not support their ally, the Netherlands, without sending a questionable signal to the emerging countries in Southeast Asia. Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, told the British Foreign Office that nonintervention by the United Kingdom, or the United States would “leave a most unfavorable impression in India and all Asian countries.”<sup>155</sup> Secretary Marshal realized that raising the issue to the UNSC would damage the United States’ prestige in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. On 30 July, 1947 Secretary Marshall informed President Truman on India’s intention and the possible repercussions to interest. He recommended President Truman to offer the Netherlands assistance in solving the dispute in a peaceful way. By doing so the United States would be able to keep the matter out of the UNSC, while balancing Dutch interests, and the United States’ interest in the region, without risking its image in the region.<sup>156</sup> On July 31, 1947 President Truman decided to accept Secretary Marshall’s recommendations. The Netherlands accepted the offer, and the Good Offices Committee (GOC) was established. The GOC was comprised of representatives from Australia, Belgium, and the United States, and opened negotiations on December 8, 1947. At this time Belgium and the United States favored the Dutch position.<sup>157</sup> In the timeframe

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<sup>155</sup>McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War*, 180.

<sup>156</sup>Ibid., 183.

<sup>157</sup>Dijk, “American Political Intervention in the Conflict in the Dutch East Indies 1945-1949,” 59.

between December 1947 and December 1948 all attempts of the GOC to negotiate a successful agreement failed. The failure of the agreements resulted mostly from Dutch refusal to allow the Republic of Indonesia any gains during the negotiations.<sup>158</sup> This Dutch stubbornness had a negative impact on the United States' perception of the Netherlands.<sup>159</sup>

The Dutch attitude towards the Republic of Indonesia started to cause a dilemma for the United States. On the one hand the Netherlands were loyal European allies. The economic development of the Netherlands was important to prevent the rise of communism in Europe. On the other hand the United States valued the freedom and self-determination of nations like Indonesia. The CIA reported its concerns of rising influence by the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia in September 1948.<sup>160</sup> The CIA perceived the rise of communism in the SEA region a real threat. Communist driven unrest in Singapore, India, and Burma could be regarded as a sign that the region was susceptible to communism. Therefore the CIA advised President Truman to balance support to the Netherlands with support to the Nationalists in order to prevent the spread of communism.<sup>161</sup> The Dutch government, aware of the United States' concern, tried to retain support by arguing that their actions were not just aimed at regaining control of their colony, but also to prevent the spread of communism in the Dutch East Indies.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>158</sup>Ibid., 67.

<sup>159</sup>Ibid., 75.

<sup>160</sup>Ibid., 69.

<sup>161</sup>Ibid.

<sup>162</sup>Ibid., 70.

The Dutch tended to react to every proposal of the GOC with a counter proposal, while violating the agreed cease fires, and accusing the Nationalists of undermining the negotiations.<sup>163</sup> On December 7 the Department of State sent an aide memoire to the Netherlands, stating that the Netherlands ought to reopen negotiations and reach a settlement with the Republic.<sup>164</sup> Between December 8-13, 1948 the State Department received information that the Netherlands did not intend to resume negotiations. The Dutch response to the aide memoire put even more strain on American-Dutch relations. On December 14 the Republic sent new proposals to the Dutch. The Dutch responded with counterproposals, demanding the surrender of the Republic. The Dutch demanded a reply from the GOC within twenty four hours.<sup>165</sup> The GOC viewed the Dutch behavior as stubborn and counterproductive. Undersecretary of State, Robert A. Lovett, was annoyed by the unreasonable behavior of the Dutch, and reported to the United States representative at the UN, Jessup. By now, the GOC had attempted to assist and guide both the Netherlands and the Nationalists toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict for over a year.<sup>166</sup> The Netherlands seemed to be unresponsive to the UN's call for cease fire, and GOC's proposals. The United States' support for the Netherlands had turned into irritation.

On December 18, 1948 the Netherlands launched their second police action Operations Kraai (Crow). This time the objective was to eliminate the Republic as an

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<sup>163</sup>Ibid., 75.

<sup>164</sup>Ibid., 76.

<sup>165</sup>Ibid., 78.

<sup>166</sup>Ibid., 79.

entity.<sup>167</sup> Although the Dutch forces reached their objectives easily, they were unable to defeat the republic's forces decisively.<sup>168</sup> In a response to the Dutch offensive the UNSC met in Paris on December 22, 1948. In two UNSC resolutions the UN member nations condemned the Dutch military action, and demanded an immediate cease fire. When the Dutch government replied that the military action was nearing its completion, the UNSC accepted the Dutch statement.<sup>169</sup> On January 28, 1949 the UNSC adopted a stronger resolution. This resolution not only called for a ceasefire, but also for the return of all political prisoners, and the opening of negotiations for the future independence of Indonesia by July 1, 1950.<sup>170</sup> The resolution also continued the work of the GOC under the name of United Nations Commission for Indonesia.

On March 31, 1949 Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, met with Dutch Foreign Minister, Dirk Stikker. During this meeting Acheson made it very clear to Minister Stikker, that failure to reach an agreement would mean that the United States Congress would never allow further Marshall and MDAP aid for the Netherlands.<sup>171</sup> Both politicians met again on April 5, 1949. During this meeting, a day after signing the North Atlantic Treaty, Secretary Acheson stipulated the importance of withdrawal of Dutch forces from all of the Republic's territory. This time Minister Stikker agreed with

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<sup>167</sup>Ibid.

<sup>168</sup>Ibid., 82.

<sup>169</sup>Ibid., 85.

<sup>170</sup>McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War*, 273.

<sup>171</sup>Dijk, “American Political Intervention in the Conflict in the Dutch East Indies 1945-1949,” 89.

Acheson's conclusion. Minister Stikker replied that the Indonesian conflict "was adversely affecting almost every important problem in Europe."<sup>172</sup> After this meeting the Dutch returned to the negotiation table on April 14, 1949.<sup>173</sup> Both the Dutch and the Republic agreed on a Round Table Conference, to be held in the Netherlands. Representatives of the Republic, the Dutch and the UN were present at the opening of the Round table Conference on August 23, 1949.<sup>174</sup> Although the negotiations were in a relatively pleasant atmosphere, both parties could not agree on the construction of a Union between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The United States' representative, Horace Merle Cochran, in the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, suggested that the Union should be a voluntary bond between two sovereign states. Although the Netherlands had always been against such a construct, they agreed this time. The Round Table Conference lasted until November 2, 1949. It ended with an agreement over the complete transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia.<sup>175</sup> On December 27, 1949 a joint ceremony was held in the Hague and Djakarta. During this ceremony sovereignty was finally transferred to the republic.<sup>176</sup>

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<sup>172</sup>McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War*, 295.

<sup>173</sup>Ibid.

<sup>174</sup>Dijk, "American Political Intervention in the Conflict in the Dutch East Indies 1945-1949," 91.

<sup>175</sup>McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War*, 303.

<sup>176</sup>Ibid.

## Rebuilding the Dutch Armed forces for collective Defense

The rebuilding of the Netherlands' armed forces was influenced by the legacy of World War II. Understanding that legacy facilitates putting the process of rebuilding in perspective. Against the background of the defeat in World War II the Dutch political and military officials constantly struggled with three related, overarching questions. These questions were: what should the balance be between economic recovery and rebuilding of the armed force be?<sup>177</sup> What could the Netherlands afford to contribute to the collective defense of the “free world,” and what area of the Netherlands would be defended by the alliance? Difference of opinion would be a constant source of tension between the political leadership and military leadership.

World War II impacted not only the military, it also affected the political perspective. For Dutch politicians the defeat in May 1940 created a mental framework that would shape future security policy decisions. World War II proved that a security policy solely based on neutrality did not provide security in all cases. Although it kept the Netherlands out of war since 1839, it was bluntly ignored by Germany on May 10, 1940.<sup>178</sup> This lesson ties in with the second lesson from the defeat by the Germans. The defeat in just five days demonstrated that the Netherlands was not powerful enough to defend itself successfully against an aggressor.<sup>179</sup> This conclusion in combination with

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<sup>177</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 15.

<sup>178</sup>Museum of National History, “Afscheid Neutraliteitspolitiek,[Goodbye Policy of Neutrality]”, National Historisch Museum, <http://www.innl.nl/page/14450/nl?source=ing> (accessed January 8, 2012).

<sup>179</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 11.

the Berlin crises and the communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in 1948 drove the Dutch government's decision to look for allies for a collective defense on the continent of Europe.<sup>180</sup> Although the Netherlands signed the Brussels' Treaty on March 17, 1948, the Dutch government already anticipated involvement in the Indies until 1952. Therefore the Dutch government did not foresee the actual rebuilding of the armed forces before 1952.<sup>181</sup> These two lessons from World War II and a clear priority for regaining control in the Dutch East Indies formed the basis for security policy in which the Dutch government tried to allow economic recovery, while waging a war in the Indies.

From the military perspective World War II also had a legacy that affected military planning long after the war. The experience of the Dutch Navy was so different compared to the experience of the Army that the impact on future planning differed greatly. For the Royal Netherlands Navy the war was not over after just five days of fighting. After the capitulation of the Netherlands a significant portion of the fleet managed to escape to the United Kingdom.<sup>182</sup> Apart from this difference in experience the navy also had a large role in defending the Dutch East Indies. In May 1940, Japan had not started its war against the Dutch East Indies yet. Therefore the Dutch Navy was still an operational entity. This different experience and status of the navy was formalized when the Dutch government in exile reestablished a separate Ministry of Navy. This decision reinstated the special status of the navy within the Dutch armed forces. It also provided the navy with a separate apparatus to develop naval plans and policy. Therefore

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<sup>180</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 17.

<sup>181</sup>Ibid., 57.

<sup>182</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 11.

the navy was able to develop naval plans divergent of the overall Dutch defense planning. These “grandiose” plans were largely justified by the need to provide security to the Dutch East Indies after World War II.<sup>183</sup> The navy anticipated that around 60 percent of its fleet would be stationed there.<sup>184</sup> In the first post-World War II naval plan the navy aimed at a large fleet of four small carrier task forces, comprising four small carriers, eight cruisers, and all supporting vessels. Dutch national sentiment felt that this large navy fitted the rich national naval tradition of the Netherlands.<sup>185</sup>

For the Royal Netherlands Army the loss of the war in just five days was a traumatic event that shaped the way the military looked at defense of the Netherlands after World War II. Next to the experience of losing against the Germans there were three additional matters that impacted future development of the army in the immediate post-World War II era. First of all the allies liberated the Netherlands in stages.<sup>186</sup> The allies liberated the Southern part of the Netherlands in September 1944. The failure of Operation Market Garden around Arnhem in September 1944 meant that the Northern part had to wait another eight months before it was liberated. In the already liberated South, people volunteered to join the hastily organized security forces to enforce civil control. This is important because the General Staff could not rebuild an army starting

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<sup>183</sup>Ibid., 13.

<sup>184</sup>Ibid.

<sup>185</sup>George C. Marshall, Telegram of Secretary of State to acting Secretary of State, May 16, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950, Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), 110.

<sup>186</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 19.

with a blank sheet, because those volunteers were to be offered a position within the future army.<sup>187</sup>

Second of all, the Dutch government decided to establish a Military Authority prior to turning control over the Netherlands over to the Dutch government again. The chief of the Military Authority was General Hendrik Johan Kruls. General Kruls' Military Authority was established as soon as the first parts in the Netherlands had been liberated in September 1944. Military Authority lasted until January 1, 1946.<sup>188</sup> General Kruls managed to stabilize the Netherlands, and establish civil control facilitating the reestablishment of civilian authorities. During this period he demonstrated that he was a rather authoritarian personality that managed to cause tension with senior government officials.<sup>189</sup> His World War II experience as an adjutant to the Minister of Defense, and his experience as Military Authority is significant because it proved that he was familiar with interaction at the highest political level. This is important, because he would become the first post-World War II Chief of the General Staff. The war in the Indies, as well as the rebuilding of the armed forces took place in his time as Chief of the General Staff.

Finally, it was decided in a meeting of the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff of February 4, 1944, that the new Dutch army units would be based on the British model for their structure and equipment.<sup>190</sup> Although this decision would mean that the army had to

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<sup>187</sup>Ibid., 21.

<sup>188</sup>Biografisch Woordenboek van Nederland, Historici.nl, <http://www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/BWN/lemmata/bwn3/kruls> (accessed March 22, 2012).

<sup>189</sup>Ibid.

<sup>190</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 19.

transition from a British model to a United States model somewhere in the future, the decision made sense at the time. This decision was largely driven by the fact that the Netherlands hoped to join the fight against Japan in the South East on the British side before the war ended.<sup>191</sup> This coincided with the fact that the Dutch East Indies were in the British South Eastern Command's area of operations.

The first plan that the General Staff made for future Dutch defense came out in 1942.<sup>192</sup> The General Staff based this plan on a threat coming from the East. The plan was largely based on the traumatic experience of May 1940. General Kruls was convinced that the policy of neutrality was the main cause of quick defeat.<sup>193</sup> It had prevented a proper preparation for the defense. This allowed Germany to conduct, what the military leadership saw as a strategic raid. To the General Staff the second reason for defeat was simply the fact that the army was to small, poorly equipped, and poorly trained.<sup>194</sup> According to General Kruls the remedy to a future strategic raid on the Netherlands was simple, the Netherlands army needed to be larger, better equipped, and better trained. To counter the effects of a strategic raid a large body of territorial troops was required.<sup>195</sup> The initial force structure that General Kruls envisioned had at least four divisions allocated to territorial troops.<sup>196</sup> This proved to be a source of tension between

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<sup>191</sup>Ibid.

<sup>192</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 10.

<sup>193</sup>Ibid., 11.

<sup>194</sup>Ibid., 10.

<sup>195</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 40.

<sup>196</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 23.

NATO and the Netherlands. The reason for the tension was the fact that General Kruls was convinced of the necessity of the troops, while NATO saw it as a waste of precious military resources, since the troops would not be available for NATO operations.<sup>197</sup>

When the Dutch Government joined the WU the national defense plans had to be put into the context of collective defense. In November 1948 Field Marshal Montgomery visited the Netherlands, as the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, to discuss the defense plans for the WU. During this visit Montgomery requested the Dutch government to provide the WU with an army corps comprising three divisions, of which one division had to be active.<sup>198</sup> In April 1949 Montgomery started to increase his pressure on the Dutch government, demanding that the Dutch government would finally decide on the Dutch force contribution to WU defense.<sup>199</sup> The Dutch were unwilling to commit these forces, nor would they consider any alternatives. The Dutch government had two reasons to stall the process. For the Netherlands, the war in the Indies started to become a protracted and costly affair.<sup>200</sup> This negatively impacted on any decision to rebuild any army for European defense. The second reason for stalling was the discussion on the line where the WU would defend its territory. Montgomery initially planned on putting the defense along the Meuse-Rhine line, while the Dutch Government wanted the Rhine-Ijssel line defended. To the Dutch this line was trivial. Defense of the Meuse-Rhine line would leave one third of the Netherlands protected, while defending the Rhine-Ijssel line

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<sup>197</sup>Ibid., 32.

<sup>198</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 68.

<sup>199</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 14.

<sup>200</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 69.

would mean that two thirds of the Netherlands would be protected.<sup>201</sup> Although the Dutch concern about the amount of territory would be defended was justified, the stalling of the Dutch only drove Montgomery more to the defense option along the Meuse-Rhine line. For Montgomery it meant that unwillingness to provide troops would simply result in a lesser ability to properly defend a larger portion of land. In this sense the Dutch approach was counterproductive, driving it away from its goal to have as much Dutch territory behind the defense line as possible. Finally the Dutch government decided during a session of the Council of Ministers in January 1949 to agree on providing three divisions for WU defense. The Dutch government did not want to risk its good relationship within the WU and did not want to jeopardize any United States support in the international community.<sup>202</sup>

The decision of the Dutch government and the WU plan had two areas for tension within the Dutch armed forces community. The WU plans did not see a large role for the Dutch navy. This large role was essential to justify the status and size of the fleet plans. This was even more important since the navy used the Indies as a justification. In 1949 the Netherlands lost the Indies. This loss also meant that the Indies could no longer be serve as a justification for a large fleet. Instead of a navy based on carrier task forces Montgomery asked the Dutch navy to provide minesweeper capability.<sup>203</sup> The Dutch

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<sup>201</sup>Ibid.

<sup>202</sup>Ibid.

<sup>203</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 15.

government did not support the vision of a limited naval role for the Netherlands.<sup>204</sup> This remained an issue when NATO became a factor later in 1949 and 1950.<sup>205</sup>

The second area of tension was between the Chief of the general Staff, General Kruls, and the Dutch government. General Kruls translated the government's decision to provide Montgomery three divisions into Plan 1950. Plan 1950 would be the first main plan to rebuild an army to contribute to the collective defense. According to Kruls' professional opinion an active division required a longer conscription period than the current term of twelve months. The term of twelve months merely allowed the army to train the soldiers on their primary duty. After having mastered that there was no time left to actually be on active duty. General Kruls argued that doubling of the conscription period was necessary.<sup>206</sup> His opinion was put aside by the Council of Ministers meeting on March 31, 1949.<sup>207</sup> The Dutch government would not allow any increase of the term for conscriptions. The government believed that extending conscription increased the financial burden of the Netherlands, it would also be an unbearable pressure for the conscripts, and the army would not have enough space available in the barracks to keep the amount of soldiers envisioned. General Kruls could not agree with the government's vision and requested HMS Queen Juliana to be relieved. In his letter to Queen Juliana he

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<sup>204</sup>W. F. Schokking, Minister of War and Navy, *Letter to Dutch representatives to NATO in Washington*, November, 17, 1949, Dutch National Archive.

<sup>205</sup>Marshall, Telegram of Secretary of State to acting Secretary of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950 Volume III, Western Europe*, Gleason, 110.

<sup>206</sup>Hendrik. J. Kruls, *Request to HMS the Queen Juliana*, April 2, 1949, Dutch National Archive, 1.

<sup>207</sup>Ibid.

gave full account of his vision, comparing the Dutch army, without any active division to an “expensive car without any sparkplugs.”<sup>208</sup> General Kruls withdrew his resignation after Prime Minister, Willem Drees, requested that he continued his work and resolve disagreement.<sup>209</sup> General Kruls accepted Drees’ request and continued his work as Dutch Chief of General Staff. The issue of conscription would not be solved until the Korean War.

Next to the two areas of tension brought forward by joining the WU, the Dutch government always feared that the military representatives at various WU and later NATO meetings and boards would promise more to the organizations than the Netherlands could afford. In particular, the navy was willing to commit to other missions than securing the North Sea. Although the Dutch government tended to support the navy’s search for a more glorifying role within the collective defense plans, it had to be balanced within financial means. This became more prominent at the end of 1949, with the cessation of operations in the Indies. Although this meant that the Ministry of War and Navy could now solely focus on rebuilding the armed forces for European defense, the settlement of the debt issue of the Republic of Indonesia put a lot of additional financial pressure on the Dutch treasury.<sup>210</sup> A letter from the Minister of War and Navy Schokking to the Chairman of the Dutch Joint Staff Mission in Washington, Admiral W. van Foreest, demonstrated these concerns. In his letter Minister Schokking ordered the

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<sup>208</sup>Ibid.

<sup>209</sup>W. F. Schokking, Minister of War and Navy, *Letter to Dutch Prime Minister, May 10, 1949*, Dutch National Archive, 1.

<sup>210</sup>McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War*, 301.

Admiral to take the financial means of the Netherlands into consideration during his negotiations.<sup>211</sup> To assist the Minister of War and Navy with the management of the rebuilding of the armed forces the Dutch government decided to create two extra positions within both ministries. Both the Ministry of War and Navy got a State Secretary (a deputy Minister) to increase cooperation between both ministries, and to better manage the tight budgets.<sup>212</sup> The new State Secretary also had to ensure better independent advice to the Minister.<sup>213</sup> On May 1, 1949 the two new State Secretaries were sworn into office.

When it became clear during 1950 that not only the WU but also NATO did not foresee any ocean going role for the Dutch navy, the Dutch government and Navy were disappointed. This became one of the focal points in the negotiations. Initially the navy saw a big opportunity when the Netherlands joined NATO. To the navy NATO was preferred over the WU because the Atlantic Ocean was now part of the area of responsibility.<sup>214</sup> The navy tried to justify an ocean going role for its fleet by using every argument available. The navy tied their argument to the protection of Dutch merchant shipping, and even the protection of oil production in the Caribbean.<sup>215</sup> On May 2, 1950 the Dutch budget was discussed in a meeting of the Council of Ministers. During the meeting Prime Minister Drees decided that the finance of the armed forces from that

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<sup>211</sup>W. F. Schokking, Minister of War and Navy, *Letter to Admiral W. van Foreest, November 21, 1949*, Dutch National Archive, 1.

<sup>212</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 16.

<sup>213</sup>Ibid., 17.

<sup>214</sup>Ibid.

<sup>215</sup>Ibid., 18.

point on ought to be in accordance with the international obligations, however painful that may be for the navy.<sup>216</sup> By May 1950, the original establishment of four carrier task forces had already been downsized to one carrier task force due to budget constraints.<sup>217</sup>

The navy debate intensified when the Dutch government had to defend their budget plans in the annual budget debates in parliament in the last quarter of 1949.<sup>218</sup> The Dutch parliament was not willing to give up the rich maritime history of the Netherlands. The parliament could not alter the way the WU or NATO saw the role of the Dutch navy, but it was within their power to force budget adjustments. The fact that the navy had close ties to the ship building industry was a major issue for parliament. A large fleet would facilitate work in the Dutch shipyards. This had a positive impact on economic recovery.<sup>219</sup> The drive to find the navy a place within the Atlantic Ocean would continue. As the United States' Ambassador in The Hague mentioned in a telegram to the State Department that "attempts to make the Netherlands [a] 'minesweeping' navy will not go down well if at all" on May 26, 1950.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>216</sup>Ibid.

<sup>217</sup>Ibid., 19. As of 1946 the Royal Netherlands Navy possessed one light fleet carrier. This carrier was on loan from the United Kingdom in their effort to reduce the costs of their navy at the end of World War II.

<sup>218</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 20.

<sup>219</sup>Ibid., 19.

<sup>220</sup>Ibid., 22.

## Conclusion

The Dutch perspective on the development of NATO prior to the outbreak of the Korean War was made up of several elements. The experience of defeat during World War II ensured that both political military officials concluded that collective defense was the only viable option for the Netherlands. The international events, as described in chapter two, drove a growing sense of mistrust between the free world and the Soviet Union. These events ensured that the Dutch government believed in collective defense and saw its necessity. The fact that the Netherlands was a founding member of both the WU and NATO demonstrates the Dutch perspective.

What membership of both the WU and NATO meant for the Netherlands and the Dutch Armed Forces proved to be a source of tension. The government's decision to give the reestablishment of control in the Dutch East Indies priority over the reestablishment of European defense forces formed a source of tension between the Netherlands and other member countries. The Dutch government basically told other WU members that she was going to join in, as soon as she was finished in the Indies. This potentially could lead to an unbalanced contribution within the WU and later NATO. Once the Dutch government decided to commit the requested amount of divisions, another internal source of tension surfaced. The amount and quality of troops that the Netherlands had to commit was subject of an internal difference of opinion between the Chief of General Staff, General Kruls, and the government. General Kruls did not agree on the level of quality the troops would have with the limited conscription time. The government on the other hand tried to raise the required divisions within the nation's financial limits.

The amount of Dutch territory that would be defended in the event of a Soviet Union attack was always a concern for the Dutch government. Field Marshal Montgomery would not defend the Rhine-Ijssel line if the Dutch government did not make a full contribution to the WU. This helped persuade the Dutch government to agree on committing three divisions of troops to the WU defense plans.

A final matter that impacted the Dutch perspective on NATO prior to the outbreak of the Korean War was the role that both the WU and NATO attributed the Dutch navy. Both security organizations argued for a minesweeping role within the North Sea, whereas the Dutch preferred an ocean going role on the Atlantic Ocean. This matter remained a source of tension between the Netherlands, the WU, and later NATO.

The Dutch government's perspective on NATO's development formed an interesting balance between the Netherlands on one side, and especially the United States on the other side. The Dutch government tried to balance its sovereignty, with its interests, and special needs on one side, and the interests of the United States, as the big provider of aid.

## CHAPTER 4

### SIGNIFICANCE OF THE KOREAN WAR

#### Introduction

At the outbreak of the Korean War the paradigm of the United States was based on mistrust of the Soviet Union. This paradigm formed the context for the United States in dealing with international security issues. The United States saw this paradigm of mistrust justified by the North Korean attack on the Republic of Korea (ROK) on June 25, 1950. Although “top officials” in Korea already warned that an attack was imminent, it came as a surprise to most of the world.<sup>221</sup> The ROK forces, fewer in quality and quantity, were no match for the army of North Korea. This contributed to North Korea’s initial success. North Korean Leader Kim Il-Sung started planning for the attack in 1949. In June 1949 the Soviet Union agreed to give North Korea military support and assistance, by signing a special protocol.<sup>222</sup> It was not until January 30, 1950 that Joseph Stalin approved military action against the ROK.<sup>223</sup> In mid-May, 1950 this was reinforced and supported by a blessing from Mao Zedong.<sup>224</sup>

While the United States tried to reevaluate its strategy on containing communism, Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, spoke to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950.

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<sup>221</sup>William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 10.

<sup>222</sup>Jian Chen and James G. Hershberg, “The Cold War in Asia,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin issue 6-7 (1995), 87.

<sup>223</sup>Ibid.

<sup>224</sup>Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History*, 31.

In this speech he identified and mentioned a perimeter in the Far East. This perimeter ran from Japan to the Philippines. Secretary Acheson did not mention Korea as part of this perimeter during this speech.<sup>225</sup> This may have given Soviet leader Stalin the impression that the United States was unwilling to get committed to a war on the Korean peninsula. Although Stalin refused earlier North Korean requests for support in the spring of 1949, Stalin was willing to support and assist North Korea's offensive as of March 1950.<sup>226</sup> This Chapter analyzes how the Korean War confirmed the United States' idea of a Soviet driven communist plot, and how it impacted the development of NATO. It addresses the response of the United States, the United Nations, and its influence on the development of NATO.

#### United States' response to the outbreak of the Korean War

The North Korean assault on June 25, 1950 confirmed the United States' paradigm, shaped by all events from 1945 on. The United States' government saw the outbreak of hostilities as an escalation in a set pattern of communist aggression. It was in line with the warnings given in NSC 68. The fact that China and the Soviet Union signed agreements on mutual help only added to their conviction. The United States first learned about Sino-Soviet agreements in 1949, when the United States' ambassador to the Republic of Korea, John J. Muccio, received two copies of those alleged agreements from

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<sup>225</sup> Acheson on the America Defense Perimeter in Asia, 1950, *The Cold War: A History through documents*, edited by Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1999), 64.

<sup>226</sup> Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside The Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 54-55.

South Korean President Syngman Rhee.<sup>227</sup> The so called Harbin Agreement dealt with political and economic cooperation. The second document, the Moscow Agreement focused on military cooperation. Although authenticity of those documents could not be confirmed at that time, the reports seemed to be a consistent line of reporting.<sup>228</sup> The Soviet Union and China finally signed a treaty of friendship in early 1950. The Kremlin released a communique announcing the Soviet-Sino treaty on friendship and cooperation on February 14, 1950.<sup>229</sup> This reinforced the suspicion of a communist plot against the free world.

The Soviet Union and the Chinese provided military support to the North Korean armed forces. The United States was aware of this. A memorandum of the NSC to President Truman mentions the presence of Soviet equipment and even troops. “In summary, Russian tanks and soldiers are now reported in South Korea, part of the 116,000 troops estimate as now fighting against us in that theater.”<sup>230</sup> These facts from a memorandum to the NSC added to the perception of a Soviet driven plot.<sup>231</sup> After all

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<sup>227</sup> Message from U.S. Ambassador (Muccio) to Secretary of State, November 17, 1949, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1949: Volume VIII, The Far East: China*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 573.

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.*, 574.

<sup>229</sup> Communique announcing the Soviet-Chinese Treaty, February 14, 1950, *The Cold War: A History through documents*, edited by Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1999), 58.

<sup>230</sup> James S. Lay Jr., Memorandum for the National Security Council, July 6, 1950, PSF/NSCF, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-16-3.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-16-3.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed January 10, 2012), 3.

<sup>231</sup> This chapter addresses how the North Korean actions were perceived by the United States at the time. Recent research on former Soviet Union’s primary sources

since the end of World War II there had been a stream of concise reports assessing and indicating the Soviet Union's policy and capabilities. The fall of China to communism and the first Soviet atomic bomb added stress to additional reports. NSC 68 added Soviet aggressive intentions as an important element in the security assessment. Therefore, although the outbreak of the Korean War came as a surprise, it was not a surprise in the sense that no communist hostilities were to be expected. There was a clear perceived threat of Soviet incited communism, it was only a matter of time before hostilities would break out. So when North Korea attacked the United States government saw their paradigm justified and assumed that the Soviet Union instigated it.<sup>232</sup> In this sense one might say that the outbreak of the Korean War served as a justification of the security assessment of NSC 68. With this in mind the United States' government tried to come up with a policy on Korea, prior to making a public statement. On the evening of June 26, 1950, President Truman held a meeting with the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>233</sup> During this meeting President Truman prepared his initial guidelines for both the government and for General MacArthur. Secretary Acheson suggested granting General MacArthur permission to utilize air and

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indicate that the Korean war was not a result of a Soviet driven plot. (Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev*, 54.)

<sup>232</sup>The Korean War, 1950-1953, *The Cold War: A History through documents*, edited by Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1999), 69.

<sup>233</sup>Phillip C. Jessup, *Minutes Blair House Meetings*, June 26, 1950, PSF/NSCF, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-12-3.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-12-3.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed January 10, 2012), 4.

naval power in support of ROK forces south of the 38th parallel.<sup>234</sup> The President agreed to assign the seventh fleet to General MacArthur to defend Formosa against a Chinese attack.<sup>235</sup> Concurrently the United States asked the Chinese Nationalist government to refrain from military actions against the Chinese mainland.<sup>236</sup> Furthermore Secretary Acheson suggested that the communist aggression should also impact on the United States' posture towards the Philippines and Indochina. In order to safeguard these two nations from communism the United States sought to increase its military presence in, aid to and support of these countries.<sup>237</sup> President Truman agreed to these suggestions. In the closing remarks of the meeting President Truman stated that he "had done everything he could for five years to prevent this kind of situation." But now that it was here they needed to do what could be done to "meet it."<sup>238</sup> He asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar N. Bradley, if he thought a mobilization of the National Guard was necessary. General Bradley advised the President to wait a few days to see the developments.<sup>239</sup> The President closed the meeting telling those present that there would

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<sup>234</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>235</sup>Ibid.

<sup>236</sup>*Minutes of a classified teletype conference between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCFE on Korean situation (nr DA TT 3426), June 1950*, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-21-5.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-21-5.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed January 10, 2012), 4.

<sup>237</sup>Jessup, *Minutes Blair House Meetings*, June 26, 1950, 3.

<sup>238</sup>Ibid., 7.

<sup>239</sup>Ibid.

be another meeting the next day at 11.30 a.m. at the White House to inform key members of Congress, and that he intended to make a statement to the press, after the meeting.<sup>240</sup>

The meeting the next morning covered the same issues. Minutes of that meeting show the primary focus was to inform the politicians, allow them to ask questions, and get a sense for their support of the directed actions. Secretary Acheson stated at the beginning that on the same day United States' ambassador in the Soviet Union, Alan G. Kirk, would contact the Soviet Union's government to ask about the Korean Attack.<sup>241</sup> Democratic Senator Millard E. Tydings informed the President on the actions taken by the Armed Service Committee that had met the same morning. The Armed Service Committee decided to extend the draft act and gave permission to the President to call up the National Guard if required.<sup>242</sup> Democratic Congressman Michael J. Mansfield suggested that, next to the increase of military aid to Formosa, the Philippines, and Indochina, Western Europe should be "stiffened" as well.<sup>243</sup> A final issue at that meeting was to make absolutely clear that the actions directly connected with Korea were in

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<sup>240</sup>The following persons were invited to the meeting: The Big Four (Lucas, Rayburn, McGormack, Vice President was out of town); Senators Connally, Wiley, George, Alexander Smith, Thomas of Utah Tydings, and bridges; congressmen Kee, Eaton, Vinson, and Short.

<sup>241</sup>Philip C. Jessup, Notes on Meeting in Cabinet Room at the White House, June 27, 1950, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-12-4.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-12-4.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed January 10, 2012), 1.

<sup>242</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>243</sup>Ibid.

support of a new United Nations' resolution that was expected to pass the same day, but that the actions towards Formosa, the Philippines, and Indochina were unilateral.<sup>244</sup>

After the meeting President Truman made a public statement on the United States' policy for Korea and the Far East on June 27, 1950. In this announcement he made it clear that it was an escalation in the relationship with communism by stating: "The attack on Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war."<sup>245</sup> General MacArthur had asked for official public statements as quickly as possible. He saw this as a vital element of reviving the fighting spirit of the South Koreans. It would demonstrate that ROK forces were not alone in this fight.<sup>246</sup>

In response to the attack Commander in Chief Far East, General MacArthur ordered the supply of ROK forces with ammunition before there was official approval by the United States.<sup>247</sup> On June 25, 1950 General MacArthur held a teleconference with the department of the Army. In this conference General MacArthur assessed the action of North Korea to be an "all-out offensive to subjugate South Korea," he also informed the

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<sup>244</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>245</sup>Statement By President Truman, June 27,1950, *The Cold War: A History through documents*, edited by Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1999), 70

<sup>246</sup>*Minutes of a classified teletype conference between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCFE on Korean situation (nr DA TT 3426)*, June, 1950, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-21-5.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-21-5.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed January 10, 2012), 7.

<sup>247</sup>*Note by George Elsey Regarding General Douglas MacArthur, June 25, 1950*, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-1-14.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-1-14.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed January 10, 2012).

Department of the Army that there had already been requests for an emergency supply of ammunition.<sup>248</sup> The following day, President Truman ordered elements of the United States Air Force and Navy to support the protection of the evacuation of United States' civilians in South Korea.<sup>249</sup> During a second teleconference between General MacArthur and the Department of the Army at 11.00 p.m. June 25, 1950 (June 26, 1950 in Korea) Korea was officially placed within the Area of Responsibility of General MacArthur, and that General MacArthur now got permission to provide supplies as advised by the United States Army Mission In Korea.<sup>250</sup> On June 27, 1950 General MacArthur received orders that were discussed during the meeting at the Blair House on the previous evening.<sup>251</sup> When ROK forces were unable to halt North Korea's forces, despite measures taken by the United States, General MacArthur received renewed guidance. A telegram, sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 29, 1950, summarized the extended clearances.<sup>252</sup> First of all it allowed General MacArthur to use the available air and naval forces directly to support ROK forces in their attempt to halt the North Korean army. In this sense it was

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<sup>248</sup> Minutes of teleconference between CINCFE and Department of the Army (Nr DA TT 3415), June 25, 1950, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-21-11.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-21-11.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed January 11, 2012), 5.

<sup>249</sup> Stueck, *The Korean War*, 11.

<sup>250</sup> Minutes of teleconference between CINCFE and Department of the Army (Nr DA TT 3417), June 25, 1950, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-21-12.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-21-12.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed January 11, 2012), 2.

<sup>251</sup> Stueck, *The Korean War*, 11.

<sup>252</sup> Emergency message from JCS to CINCFE (Nr JCS 84681), June 29, 1950, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-3-19.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-3-19.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed January 11, 2012), 1.

the first time that the United States would contribute to halting communism by the use of force. This brought the Truman doctrine to a new level. The United States was now willing to physically combat the spread of communism with military means, other than supplies and advisors.<sup>253</sup> Second, it gave permission to use ground forces with the limited objective of retaining a sea port for later use. This authorized the deployment of Task Force Smith. The new guidance gave permission to extend operations into North Korea. This was with the specific restriction to stay well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria and the Soviet Union. The message gave another specific restriction to General MacArthur. It ordered him to not engage in hostilities with Soviet troops, should those get involved.<sup>254</sup>

On June 27, 1950 United States ambassador to the Soviet Union, Allan G. Kirk, brought a message from the Department of State to the Soviet government.<sup>255</sup> In this message Kirk asked the Soviet government if it was willing to use its influence over the North Korean authorities “to withdraw their invading forces immediately.”<sup>256</sup> On June 29, 1950, ambassador Kirk reported the Soviet response to the United States. He was visited by a party of Soviet diplomats, led by Andrei A. Gromyko. Gromyko read an official statement in reply to Kirk’s request. Gromyko opened by stating that the

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<sup>253</sup> Robert M. Citino, *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 117.

<sup>254</sup> *Emergency message from JCS to CINCFE (Nr JCS 84681), June 29, 1950*, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-3-19.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-3-19.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed January 11, 2012), 2.

<sup>255</sup> There is no specific indication to which Soviet government official the telegram was delivered.

<sup>256</sup> Alan G. Kirk, *Telegram Ambassador Kirk to Secretary of State, June 29, 1950*, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-3-9.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ki-3-9.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed January 11, 2012), 1.

hostilities were not initiated by the North Koreans, but provoked by ROK forces.<sup>257</sup> Second Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union was quicker to redraw their forces from Korean soil, in the aftermath of World War II, than the United States. This was in line with the adherence of the Soviet Union's policy of the "traditional principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states."<sup>258</sup> His third statement responded to the Security Council Resolution 83. He declared that it was not the Soviet Union that failed to attend the Security Council meeting on June 27, 1950. He stated that the failure of the United Nations to recognize the legitimate People's Republic of China as a member of the Security Council made the Security Council illegitimate. Therefore Resolution 83 was no official resolution, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned.<sup>259</sup> Ambassador Kirk asked Gromyko whether this was the reply to his request of June 27, 1950. Gromyko responded by stating that this was the entire official response. It was clear that the Soviet Union was not willing to use its influence to stop North Korean aggression.

#### The Response of the United Nations Security Council

The Security Council of the United Nations discussed the matter on June 25, 1950. The Security Council discussed a proposed resolution, put forward by the ambassador of Yugoslavia.<sup>260</sup> After deliberation the Security Council came out with a

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<sup>257</sup>Ibid.

<sup>258</sup>Ibid.

<sup>259</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>260</sup>Stueck, *The Korean War*, 12.

relatively mild resolution, directing North Korea to cease hostilities and to return north of the 38th parallel.<sup>261</sup> When the North Koreans demonstrated no intentions to abide by the resolution, the Security Council met again on June 27, 1950. This time the Soviet Union chose not to attend the meeting out of protest over the Chinese question. By not attending, the Soviet Union gave up their chance to alter the course of events. The Soviet Union was not able to veto any resolution when not present. This created a window for the United States to come up with an alternative resolution. This time the attempt was supported by reports from the United Nations Committee on Korea. The United Nations had established this observer organization with the purpose of providing advanced warning of hostilities. Their report assessed that the North Korean attack was a deliberate, well thought through action and that the South Korean posture had strictly been defensive. This conclusion pointed out that North Korea was the sole aggressor in this war. This background and the fact that North Korea demonstrated no intention to call off the attack swung sympathy in favor of the Republic of South Korea. With a vote of seven to one the UNSC accepted Resolution 83 on June 27, 1950. This resolution called upon member countries of the United Nations to assist the Republic of Korea “repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.”<sup>262</sup> In the course of 1950 sixteen other countries, in addition to the United States, responded to this call.

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<sup>261</sup>United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 82 (1950)*. 25 June 1950, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/064/95/IMG/NR006495.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed January 25, 2012).

<sup>262</sup>United Nations Security Council *Resolution 83 (1950)*. 27 June 1950, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/064/97/IMG/NR006497.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed January 25, 2012).

For the first time in the history of the United Nations, they committed a multi-national force to combat the breach of international peace.

### The Korean War and NATO development

The outbreak of the Korean War confirmed Western suspicion of the Soviet Union's intentions.<sup>263</sup> This confirmation had a big impact on the further development of NATO. Up until June 1950, most of the NATO countries made "little progress translating plans to action."<sup>264</sup> The outbreak of the Korean War had numerous consequences for NATO. It did not just create change instantaneously, but it opened a debate on certain topics that led to change. After all NATO dealt with the security question for separate sovereign countries. In this respect speed of diplomatic development was relative. The Korean War started development in three major interlocking areas within NATO. It influenced the high level command structure, the force structure, and the enlargement of NATO with new members. The issues discussed and eventually solved were, in itself, not necessary the result of the Korean War. It was more that the Korean War meant that those known issues could no longer be ignored by the organization. Although all the NATO countries were involved in this process, the United States, being the biggest and most powerful member, drove this process.

The high level command structure changed as a result of the Korean War. Those matters were mostly of a diplomatic nature. The "schizophrenic" relationship between

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<sup>263</sup> Nye Jr., *Understanding International Conflict*, 107.

<sup>264</sup> Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., *Dynamics of World Power: A Documentary History of the United States Foreign Policy 1945-1973, Volume 1, Western Europe* (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1973), 154.

NATO and the Western Union was one of these issues. This issue was brought up by United States' ambassador to the United Kingdom, Lewis W. Douglas, in a telegram he sent to the Secretary of State.<sup>265</sup> At that time the Western Union was not a formal part of NATO, although the members of the Western Union were all NATO members. This seemed to be a duplication of effort. This schizophrenic relationship, with its own high command structure, could interfere with the development of NATO's command structure. This matter was eventually solved in 1951 when the Brussels treaty was adjusted, and the actual mutual defense arrangement was taken over by NATO.

In an effort to make the command structure more effective, the United States introduced the idea of unity of command for all NATO forces. This meant that countries had to be willing to give up a part of "sovereignty," in relation to the forces provided to that unified command. A message from the Department of State to the Department of Defense shows this as one of the consequences of unity of command under a United States commander.<sup>266</sup> Ambassador Douglas in London supported this line of thought by suggesting that the United States should provide an overall commander for all defense forces.<sup>267</sup> During the sixth session of the NATO council in December 1950 the NATO

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<sup>265</sup> Telegram from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom to Secretary of State, August 8, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 131.

<sup>266</sup> Message from Under Secretary of State to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance, August 6, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 213.

<sup>267</sup> Telegram from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom to Secretary of State, August 8, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*.

countries unanimously requested President Truman to make General Dwight D. Eisenhower available to take on the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).<sup>268</sup> The establishment and position of SACEUR is significant. It is not just a position to command troops in the event of war, but it is a military position in a diplomatic arena. In that diplomatic arena member countries had to balance between national interests and NATO interests. This asked for a specific skill set, which General Eisenhower possessed.

Another field for major change as a result of the Korean War was the actual force structure of NATO. The United States saw the outbreak of the Korean War as confirmation of a Soviet driven plot to expand communism in Asia. Therefore the United States thought it was absolutely necessary to bolster NATO defense. Only in that way would NATO be ready to halt the expected Soviet Union attack. As the biggest power within NATO the United States wanted to know how all the NATO members intended to increase their defense contribution. Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War Secretary of State Acheson sent a telegram to all United States diplomats in NATO countries. In this telegram Secretary Acheson relayed a message from President Truman. President Truman argued the Korean War justified an increase in military effort.<sup>269</sup> He urged other the NATO members to do the same, and expressed that the United States

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*Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 190.

<sup>268</sup> Schlesinger, *Dynamics of World Power*, Volume 1, 160.

<sup>269</sup> Telegram from Secretary of State to certain Diplomatic offices, July 22, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 138.

would support the increase in military capacity for other NATO countries. He made it clear that this matter had to take priority over economic development, and that he would ask Congress for additional funds to support our allies.<sup>270</sup> He asked NATO countries to demonstrate the same resolve as the United States. President Truman directed his diplomats to make sure that these matters would be discussed on the highest levels within the separate NATO countries, without making it too obvious that the United States is telling the countries what to do.<sup>271</sup> The telegram stated that the United States expected to be briefed back on the decisions of the NATO countries by August 5, 1950. This telegram, nearly a month after opening of hostilities can be seen as a driving force behind the establishment of a force structure within NATO. All in all President Truman expected the NATO countries to increase troop strength, increase military production to maximum level, and increase further cooperation between the European countries in order to make this effort work.<sup>272</sup> These additional forces had to be equipped and available by 1954. To demonstrate the United States' commitment to Western Europe's defense, the United States decided to station four additional divisions in Europe. Apart from the actual value as combat units, it also boosted confidence and morale in Western Europe. The enlargement of the force pool available to NATO tied in with development of the command structure. A large European Defense Force would in itself require a proper integrated command structure and the re-armament of Germany.

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<sup>270</sup> Telegram from Secretary of State to certain Diplomatic offices, July 22, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 139.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

<sup>272</sup> Ibid., 140.

In order to equip and maintain the increased force structure properly, production capacity became an issue. European NATO members tried to balance their industrial capacity between the demanded “war” production and the development of their economies. This would prove to be a source of tension between the United States, as provider of Marshall Aid, and other NATO countries. The United States influenced European production, by tying further United States’ aid to the “scope and adequacy” of the defensive efforts of the separate countries.<sup>273</sup> This way the United States was able to leverage its economic might. Figures of Western European vehicle production did demonstrate an increase of capacity. In 1947 Western Europe produced 54,000 vehicles per month; in 1951 this figure rose to 145,000 vehicles per month.<sup>274</sup>

The third area of change was the enlargement of NATO. The first two countries to join NATO as new members were Greece and Turkey. This is significant for two reasons. First of all, United States’ support to both countries in order to halt a communist insurgency was the reason for the actual proclamation of the Truman doctrine in 1947. Accepting these two countries into NATO after defeating communist-insurgencies successfully bolstered the Truman doctrine. Second of all, the new member countries consolidated NATO’s position in the Mediterranean area. With that NATO was able to put pressure on the Southwestern flank of the Soviet Union.<sup>275</sup>

Apart from Greece’s and Turkey’s membership, the perception of imminent danger to Western Europe opened the discussion of other future members. Both Spain

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<sup>273</sup> Schlesinger, *Dynamics of World Power, Volume 1*, 5.

<sup>274</sup> Ibid., 105.

<sup>275</sup> Ibid., 5.

and Germany were discussed as future members. Both countries had an outcast status at that time within Europe, Germany for its aggression during WW II, and Spain for its regime under fascist General Franco. The relevance of Spain to NATO lay in the fact that it would make NATO a contiguous area. This allowed the full utilization of Portugal on the one hand, and a safe haven south of the Pyrenees in case a defense against the Soviet Union failed.

In particular the Korean War opened up the debate about German re-armament and membership. With German aggression in World War II still fresh in the Europe's memory, this was a troublesome debate. France, especially, had trouble with the idea of German rearmament and membership. On one hand there was the enormous industrial and military potential of Germany that would boost NATO end strength, especially in meeting the 1954 force goals.<sup>276</sup> On the other hand World War II had left Europe with scars, not easily forgotten. However, the United States, aware of these sensitivities, saw a German contribution to a deliberate NATO defense as essential.<sup>277</sup> The subject was a constant issue during the meetings until Germany became a member in 1955.

### Conclusion

The outbreak of the Korean War was relevant for the appreciation of the security situation of the free world. It confirmed the pattern of mistrust that had steadily grown since the end of World War II. It confirmed the United States' perception of Soviet

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<sup>276</sup>Ibid.

<sup>277</sup>Message from Under Secretary of State to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance, August 6, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 213.

intended expansion of communism. With the United States as the most influential member of NATO, the United States therefore shaped the development of NATO. The Korean War drove NATO's transition from a merely political organization to a more mature defense organization. The change within NATO concerned three major areas. The first area concerned the development of NATO's high command structure with the installation of General Eisenhower as the first SACEUR. The second area concerned the establishment of defense forces with increased numbers of divisions to be ready by 1954. The third area concerned the enlargement of NATO, with Turkey and Greece being admitted as two new members. Next to the enlargement with Turkey and Greece, the Korean War opened the discussions about further enlargement with Spain and Germany. The utilization and rearmament of Germany proved to be topic of special debate.

# CHAPTER 5

## THE DUTCH PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT OF NATO

### DURING THE KOREAN WAR

#### Introduction

Chapter 4 identified how the outbreak of the Korean War drove development within NATO in three major areas. It expedited the development of a military high command system under the leadership of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, it established a force goal for the alliance, and it opened up the discussion about the expansion of NATO with new members. This chapter answers the question of what the Dutch perspective was on the further development of NATO during the Korean War. The next paragraph provides an insight into the development of the Dutch armed forces between June 1950 and February 1952.

#### Build-up of Dutch Armed Forces between June 25, 1950 and February 20, 1952

Just prior to the outbreak of the Korean War the Dutch government decided on contributing to WU and NATO defense with an army of three divisions.<sup>278</sup> Out of those three divisions one was going to be active and the other two being reserve divisions. All three divisions were supposed to be operationally ready by the end of 1951. NATO plans for the Navy were less favorable. According to the Dutch Navy, parliament, and national sentiment a blue water navy fitted the maritime tradition of the Netherlands and was therefore important to the Dutch. Next to that would an ocean going role of the fleet

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<sup>278</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 15.

translate into larger investments in the Dutch shipbuilding industry. It was therefore a big disappointment when both the WU and NATO saw no ocean-going role for the Dutch Navy. Prime Minister Drees, although the Minister of War and Navy and parliament wanted a larger role, made the painful decision that the budget for the navy would be in accordance with the NATO assigned role.

After the outbreak of the Korean War the Dutch government decided to support UNSC resolution 83 by only sending a navy vessel, the HMS Evertsen on July 4, 1950.<sup>279</sup> The Dutch government decided against sending ground forces for two reasons. First, the army had just started the process of building up for the defense of Western Europe after being committed to war in the Indies for over three years.<sup>280</sup> Second, and more importantly, the Dutch government thought that the United States' response to the whole "communist threat" seemed exaggerated.<sup>281</sup> This line of thought formed the basis of the official Dutch view when the United States inquired within NATO what the other NATO partners intended to do about their overall increase of strength. With a telegram by the Secretary of State Acheson to its diplomats within the NATO countries of July 22, 1950 the United States started the process of boosting the increase of NATO production and troop strength.<sup>282</sup> The telegram indicated that the United States expected an answer from

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<sup>279</sup>Yu Man Kap, ed., *The History of The United Nations Forces In The Korean War: Volume III, part 7* (Seoul; Ministry of National Defense Republic of Korea, 1973), 429.

<sup>280</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 72.

<sup>281</sup>Ibid.

<sup>282</sup>Telegram from Secretary of State to certain Diplomatic offices, July 22, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 138.

its allies by August 5, 1950. The Dutch government responded by increasing the defense budget by 15 percent, and recalled one levee of conscripts for a three month period.<sup>283</sup>

Prime Minister Drees thought the measures taken by the Netherlands were impressive.<sup>284</sup>

During the period between July 22, 1950 and August 4, 1950 United States diplomats within the NATO countries kept track on the responses of the various governments of the NATO countries. A telegram of July 26, 1950 between the secretary of State Acheson and United States' Embassies informed the ambassadors in the NATO countries of the Dutch situation. It reported that the Dutch Foreign Minister, Stikker, seemed to be the only official in favor of a stepped up defense program within the Netherlands, and that he was in conflict with the Finance Minister, Piet Lieftinck, over increased defense expenditures.<sup>285</sup> Two days later, on July 28, 1950 a telegram shows a slight change in the Dutch approach. In this telegram Secretary of State Acheson reported that the Dutch government debated a further increase of the defense budget, and that the Dutch were reconsidering committing ground forces to assist the UN effort in Korea.<sup>286</sup> Three days later the Dutch government still seemed undecided about the exact increase of their overall contribution. These telegrams show that the Dutch government was divided over the matter, with minister Stikker being the only member in favor of a large increase

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<sup>283</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 25.

<sup>284</sup>Ibid.

<sup>285</sup>Telegram from Secretary of State to certain Diplomatic offices, July 26, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 142.

<sup>286</sup>Telegram from Secretary of State to certain Diplomatic offices, July 28, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 151.

of the Dutch contribution.<sup>287</sup> The United States was disappointed in the meager Dutch response to the request to increase war production and increase troop strength.<sup>288</sup> Finally on August 4, 1950, one day prior to the requested date to report back to the United States on the steps taken by the individual countries, the United States' Deputy representative at the North Atlantic Council, Charles Spofford, reported back to the Secretary of State Acheson that the responses by the individual NATO countries "show considerable less than hoped for."<sup>289</sup> Not just the Netherlands, but overall the Europeans demonstrated "less feeling of urgency."<sup>290</sup>

The response of the NATO countries to the request of the United States of July 22, 1950 disappointed Spofford. Unsatisfied with the measures of the NATO countries, Spofford restating the question. On August 4, 1950 Spofford reported to Secretary Acheson that he once more asked the fellow deputies on the North Atlantic Council to inform him on the steps taken by their governments, and to see what further increase they were willing to make as of July 1951.<sup>291</sup> This time Spofford gave the NATO countries until August 28, 1950 to provide an answer. In the meantime the United States tried to

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<sup>287</sup> Telegram from Secretary of State to certain Diplomatic offices, July 28, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 164.

<sup>288</sup> Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 25.

<sup>289</sup> Telegram from The United States deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council to the Secretary of State, August 4, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 184.

<sup>290</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>291</sup> *Ibid.*, 188.

put on more pressure, and persuade their allies to increase their contributions. Because the United States provided enormous funds for the economic recovery and provided an enormous amount of military aid, the United States saw their diplomatic pressure justified. This approach was already put forward by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. In this memorandum the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar N. Bradley mentioned that the United States should accept the increase in production and forces on the condition that the other NATO countries “pull their full share.”<sup>292</sup> In this memorandum General Bradley stated that the United States “has the right to specify those conditions to other NATO countries.”<sup>293</sup> United States pressure made the Netherlands rethink their contribution to the Korean War. On August 11, 1950 the Dutch government decided to commit ground forces to the UN operation in Korea.<sup>294</sup>

For the Minister of War and Navy, Willem F. Schokking, 1950 was a politically difficult year. His personal position within the government was again overshadowed by growing tension between the Dutch General Staff and government.<sup>295</sup> In 1950 it became clear that General Kruls discussed a Dutch NATO contribution that was higher than what the government had agreed upon. Thereby he demonstrated disjointedness between the

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<sup>292</sup>Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, July 13, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 134.

<sup>293</sup>Ibid.

<sup>294</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 72.

<sup>295</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 24.

Dutch political version and the Dutch military version of the contribution to NATO.<sup>296</sup>

As a result the Dutch government, in particular Prime Minister Drees, saw this as an embarrassment for the Netherlands. On top of this, the War Ministry had to admit to mismanagement of the defense budget, adding more reasons to be displeased with the Minister and the General Staff.<sup>297</sup> On October 11, 1950 Minister Schokking resigned, after a vote of no confidence.<sup>298</sup> His resignation had come at a precarious time, just two weeks prior to the meeting of the Defense Committee in Washington D.C. At this meeting the NATO countries were about to discuss the individual nations contributions and progress. His replacement, Hendrik L. s'Jacobs, represented the Netherlands in the meeting of the defense Committee at the end of October, 1950. During this meeting Minister s'Jacobs reported that the Netherlands had only two divisions operationally ready, and not the third. He also reported that these two divisions would not be ready at the agreed end of 1951.<sup>299</sup> This negative report surprised and disappointed the United States, which proposed cutting aid by 45 million dollars immediately.<sup>300</sup> The report Minister s'Jacobs provided left an unfavorable impression of the Netherlands at the meeting. Although internally the Dutch government, in particular Ministers s'Jacobs, Stikker, and Prime Minister Drees discussed their preparedness to offer up to five divisions to contribute to the defense of Western Europe during a preliminary discussion

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<sup>296</sup>Ibid.

<sup>297</sup>Ibid.

<sup>298</sup>Ibid., 26.

<sup>299</sup>Ibid., 27.

<sup>300</sup>Ibid.

on October 16, 1950.<sup>301</sup> When Minister s' Jacobs returned to the Netherlands Prime Minister Drees inquired why he had made those statements. Minister s' Jacobs told him that it was according to the advice of General Kruls. This added further tension to the already deteriorating relationship between General Kruls and the Prime-Minister Drees.<sup>302</sup>

On January 10 the newly appointed SACEUR visited the Netherlands to get an impression of the Dutch activities, contributions, and plans.<sup>303</sup> At the end of his visit General Eisenhower was disappointed about the Dutch plans. Immediately after his departure he expressed his disappointment in a letter to the United States Ambassador in the Netherlands, Selden Chapin.<sup>304</sup> In his letter General Eisenhower gave his views, and gave ambassador Chapin permission to show the letter to the Dutch government. According to General Eisenhower the Dutch had no clear goal, and did not show a sense of urgency. He stated that he did not understand how a country of ten million people would be incapable of producing a five division army. Ambassador Chapin showed the letter to Minister Stikker on January 16, 1951.<sup>305</sup> Minister Stikker responded by agreeing

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<sup>301</sup>Ibid.

<sup>302</sup>Ibid.

<sup>303</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 81.

<sup>304</sup>Letter of “The SACEUR” (General Eisenhower) to the Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin), January 13, 1951, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1951: Volume III, European Security and the German Question*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 417.

<sup>305</sup>Telegram The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Embassy in Portugal, January 16, 1951, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1951: Volume III, European Security and the German Question*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 425.

with General Eisenhower's observations. Pleased by the letter he stated "Personally and very confidentially, I will be indiscreet enough to say that I like the letter."<sup>306</sup> Minister Stikker also told Ambassador Chapin how Prime Minister Drees was hurt by the attack on him in an article in the *Herald Tribune* on January 11, 1951 in which Drees was depicted as another "socialist, uninterested in defense."<sup>307</sup> Minister Stikker promised ambassador Chapin that he would do his utmost to further boost the Dutch contribution.<sup>308</sup>

After the discussion between Minister Stikker and Ambassador Chapin, the latter reported his findings to the State Department on January 19, 1951. In the telegram Chapin mentioned the "Fuss and Furor" that General Eisenhower's visit and the leaking of his letter to the press had caused.<sup>309</sup> Chapin reported that Prime Minister Drees suspected the General Staff leaked the letter to the press.<sup>310</sup> According to Ambassador Chapin's assessment the whole ordeal might have a positive influence on the Dutch attitude after all. He referred to Minister Stikker's speech in Parliament, where Stikker said "national existence is at stake."<sup>311</sup> The whole Eisenhower visit lifted the distrust

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<sup>306</sup>Ibid.

<sup>307</sup>Ibid., 426.

<sup>308</sup>Ibid.

<sup>309</sup>Telegram The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State, January 19, 1951, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1951: Volume III, European Security and the German Question*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 436.

<sup>310</sup>Ibid.

<sup>311</sup>Ibid.

between the Dutch Prime Minister Drees and General Kruls to a new level, as the government saw the public humiliation the Eisenhower visit caused as instigated by General Kruls. On January 22, 1951 the Council of Ministers accepted the Prime Minister's proposal to relieve the Chief of General Staff, General Kruls.<sup>312</sup> The next day Minister s' Jacobs fired General Kruls.

However unpleasant the Dutch government experienced the outcome of the Eisenhower visit, it did finally get a message across. In March 1951 the Dutch government made up its mind about the Dutch contribution to NATO forces. The Netherlands increased the number of divisions from three to five.<sup>313</sup> The Conscription period was extended from twelve months to eighteen months.<sup>314</sup> The Netherlands utilized the full potential of its male population, to man the divisions.<sup>315</sup>

The Netherlands used the remainder of the 1951-1952 timeframe to increase its production, and to build the divisions. In July 1950 the Dutch army already switched from its British organization to the United States organization, complicating matters.<sup>316</sup> In April 1951 the Dutch government decided to assign the defense of the Dutch Antilles to the Dutch Marines, freeing up army capabilities for the European build-up.<sup>317</sup> The third and final big change linked with reports from the Temporary Council Committee.

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<sup>312</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 29.

<sup>313</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 81.

<sup>314</sup>Ibid.

<sup>315</sup>Ibid., 82.

<sup>316</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 75.

<sup>317</sup>Ibid., 65.

The Temporary Council Committee had to evaluate the development of NATO strength in the different countries.<sup>318</sup> A day before the opening of the Lisbon Summit the Temporary Council Committee reported that the availability of troops might not be the biggest problem, but that the troops would be lacking operational readiness.<sup>319</sup> This also applied to the divisions of the Dutch army. In order to deal with that issue the Dutch General Staff introduced a new system for calling up conscripts and filling units. By calling up smaller levees of conscripts on a more regular basis, the General Staff was able to retain some of the operational experience, and increase the overall operational readiness of the active components.<sup>320</sup>

For the navy the timeframe between June 1950 and February 1952 started off negative. Both the WU and NATO had emphasized a clear priority on the development and increase of army strength. The Dutch government decided that this ought to be reflected in the way the defense budget was allocated. Next to the financial setback the timeframe started without an ocean going role for the Royal Netherlands Navy. Both the WU and NATO needed the Dutch navy to limit their operations to securing the North Sea area. According to the WU and NATO the fleet ought to be in accordance with this mission. This meant that according to the WU and NATO the fleet ought to primarily be based around minesweepers and other smaller vessels. The Light carrier, HMS Karel

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<sup>318</sup>Ibid., 90.

<sup>319</sup>Telegram: The Secretary of State to the Department of State, February 20, 1952, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954: Volume V, Western European Security*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 220.

<sup>320</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 91.

Doorman, and the planned destroyers did not fit in this type of fleet. Interestingly enough the United States did provide aid that did not match up with the envisaged role of the Dutch navy. The United States provided the first two destroyers of a total of six in June 1950.<sup>321</sup> Further financial aid also supported the building of more destroyers in the Dutch shipyards. This seemed paradoxical to the fact that the United States only allowed aid if it linked to support of NATO plans.<sup>322</sup> This sent a mixed signal to the Dutch government and navy.

In September 1950 the Dutch government requested permission to join the newly formed Atlantic Planning Group.<sup>323</sup> This planning group created the plans to secure NATO's lines of communication on the Atlantic Ocean. The members of the planning group, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, allowed the Dutch to sit in on its meetings. The fact that there was an overall shortage of all naval capabilities within NATO played a part in advising positively by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the United States government.<sup>324</sup> This finally opened the door for an Atlantic role for the Royal Netherlands Navy.<sup>325</sup> To NATO this was not very significant, but to the Netherlands it was very significant.

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<sup>321</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 20.

<sup>322</sup>Ibid., 21.

<sup>323</sup>Ibid.

<sup>324</sup>Ibid., 22.

<sup>325</sup>Ibid.

### Analysis of Dutch Interests and its influence on the Dutch perspective

Before it is possible to understand the Dutch response to the three areas of major change within NATO as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War, it is necessary to understand the interests of the Netherlands in June 1950. The outbreak of the Korean War did not fundamentally change these Dutch interests. It did force the Dutch government to reevaluate where there would be tension between Dutch and United States interests. The Dutch government tried to identify areas where they could easily afford to support the United States, so the Netherlands would retain the support of the United States.

#### Dutch Political interests

At the political level Dutch interests affected the way the Dutch government approached the United States and NATO. The June 1950, to February 1952 time frame saw four Dutch political interests driving the government's actions. First, the Dutch government wanted to improve the the relationship between the United States and the Netherlands. The historically good relationship had suffered as a result of the Indonesian affair of 1948 and 1949. Some elements within Dutch society blamed the United States for the loss of the Dutch East Indies, and the United States was aware of this.<sup>326</sup> With this in mind the Dutch government started 1950 with a priority for economic recovery, made more important with the loss of the Indies. The economic recovery only became more important because of the financial settlement at the end of hostilities in the Indies. The outbreak of the Korean War did not automatically change this political interest.

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<sup>326</sup>Policy Statement on: The Relation of the United States with the Netherlands, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 1524.

The second Dutch interest was to be and to remain a credible ally and partner.<sup>327</sup>

The government tried to achieve that by balancing economic growth with growth of military strength. The Dutch still aimed at economic recovery, preferably as a priority, but if impossible, at least balanced with rearmament. The need for economic recovery fed the Dutch interest to tap into the United States' economic and military aid. The eventual decision to commit Dutch ground forces to Korea can be seen as a result of this interest.

The third political interest was to get as much Dutch territory covered within the NATO defense plans as possible. This drove the Dutch desire to get the rivers Rhine and Ijssel to be accepted as the defensive line. Even with a defense along the Rhine-Ijssel line, one third of the Netherlands would be undefended. This meant that in negotiations the Dutch preferred a forward defense more to the East.

Finally, the Dutch government wanted to count as a smaller but equally important partner within NATO. The Dutch government worried that too many topics were settled amongst the big three within the Standing group without consultation of the smaller NATO members. The Dutch worried that these decisions would be based solely on interests of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. On September 14, 1950 Minister Stikker mentioned his concerns in a meeting with Secretary Acheson. He expressed his worry about the discussion amongst the big three over future membership of Turkey and future Germany Rearmament.<sup>328</sup> During the sixth meeting of the North

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<sup>327</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 18.

<sup>328</sup>Memorandum of conversation, by special assistant to the Secretary of State (Battle), September 14, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 1231.

Atlantic Council, Minister Stikker made similar objections to the fact that the three nations discussed the distribution of raw materials amongst the NATO countries.<sup>329</sup> In this case the Dutch minister rallied the support of Denmark and the BENELUX countries.<sup>330</sup> On both occasions Secretary Acheson managed to clarify and settle the matter, but Minister Stikker did manage to get his point across.



Figure 2. Comparison of defended territory for the Meuse-Rhine line and the Rhine-IJssel line.

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<sup>329</sup>United States Delegation Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Sixth Session of the North Atlantic Treaty Council With the Defense Ministers, December 19, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 601.

<sup>330</sup>Ibid., 602.

## Interests of the Dutch Armed Forces

The interest of the armed forces differed for the navy and for the army. For the army the experiences of World War II drove the first interest of the General Staff. The General Staff wanted a large contingent of territorial troops to prevent a future strategic raid on the Netherlands. It was in the interest of the General Staff to pursue an army with both a large body of troops answerable to NATO and a large body of territorial troops.

The second interest of the General Staff was to be a serious partner professionally. To General Kruls this meant that the army had to have a fair amount of active troops. This was in line with the ideas within NATO's military establishment. According to General Kruls this could only be reached with a longer conscription period. This question became the kernel of the discussion between Dutch military and political leadership.<sup>331</sup> This discussion formed the content of a personal letter from General Kruls to Minister s'Jacobs, as a result of Eisenhower's visit. In his letter General Kruls objected to having any further part in keeping up a "military façade," pretending that the Dutch government made serious efforts to contribute to NATO.<sup>332</sup>

Third the General Staff did not want to utilize veterans from the Indonesian campaign.<sup>333</sup> According to the General Staff these conscripts would be of very little value, given the different character of war within the Indies and Europe. This coincides

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<sup>331</sup>Notes for Prime Minister Drees, January 27, 1951, Dutch National Archive, PU/3, 2.

<sup>332</sup>Hendrik J. Kruls, *Letter from Chief of General Staff, General Kruls, to the Minister of War and Navy, Mr. s'Jacobs (Nr. 51/74)*, January 19, 1951, Dutch National Archive, 5.

<sup>333</sup>Honig, Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance, 27.

with the General Staff's wishes to use only new MDAP equipment.<sup>334</sup> General Kruls tried to prevent having to use "old" World War II equipment that was left by the British and Canadian forces after liberation. This interest of General Kruls formed one of the causes for the growing dispute between him and the government.

The interest of the navy remained obvious during the June 1950 to February 1952 timeframe. For the navy, the only interest remained the ocean going role. The navy saw its interest supported by elements within the government and parliament, for they still saw the Netherlands as a medium-sized naval power.<sup>335</sup> For the navy it was important that the discussion about the maritime contribution remained open. As long as the navy's budget was sufficient to keep the light carrier HMS Karel Doorman operational, the Dutch fleet was up to an ocean going role.

#### Conflict of interest between the United States and the Netherlands

The Dutch interests, as described above, caused tension with the interests of the United States on some occasions after the outbreak of the Korean War. Both countries had to identify ways to achieve their goals while acknowledging their ally's interest. One year prior to the Korean War, both nations had opposing views in the case of Indonesia. The State Department was aware of the sentiment within Dutch society and of the fact that a part of society blamed the loss of Indonesia on United States' involvement.<sup>336</sup>

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<sup>334</sup>Ibid.

<sup>335</sup>Ibid., 11.

<sup>336</sup>Policy Statement on: The Relation of the United States with the Netherlands, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 1524.

However, both countries now needed each other. On a macro scale the United States wanted the Dutch to increase security measures, without openly directing them how to run their financial, defense, and foreign policy. On the other hand the Netherlands needed the financial and military aid to boost their economic growth to reestablish their armed forces. For the Netherlands it was important to balance their own will with being a credible ally.

The first conflict of interests arose as a direct result of the outbreak of the Korean War. The United States saw the outbreak of the war, at that time, as evidence of a Soviet driven plot to wage war on the “free” world. The Netherlands did not perceive the same threat.<sup>337</sup> The Dutch were not unique in this view. A memorandum of Secretary Acheson to President Truman on the problems within NATO of January 5, 1951, shows that more European countries had this perception.<sup>338</sup> In the end the Dutch government decided in favor of sending ground troops to support the UN operation. Despite, what Hans Morgenthau called “Token forces” They were a way of the Dutch government to be a credible partner.<sup>339</sup>

The third conflict of interests lingered in the background since the start of the Korean War, but surfaced clearly as a result of General Eisenhower’s visit to the Netherlands on January 10, 1951. General Eisenhower’s open disappointment with the

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<sup>337</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 72.

<sup>338</sup>Dean G. Acheson, *Memorandum for the President*, Truman Library, [http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study\\_collections/nato/large/documents/pdfs/2-1.pdf#zoom=100](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nato/large/documents/pdfs/2-1.pdf#zoom=100) (accessed December 5, 2011), 3.

<sup>339</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1973), 425.

Dutch government made it bluntly clear that the United States had a different view. Especially in his letter and the article in the *Herald Tribune* which set the political wheels back in motion. On January 31, 1951 General Eisenhower gave his overall feedback of his trip to the NATO countries to members of the United States cabinet. During his briefs, he stated the following “Every country, Eisenhower said, seemed to him to be trying hard except Holland. He can’t understand Holland or the attitude of the Dutch. All they seem interested in is a navy, which doesn’t make any sense to him, when they ought to be worrying about the land defenses of Holland.”<sup>340</sup> This feedback shows the Dutch obsession for an ocean going navy and an unwillingness to enlarge the army and conscription. According to General Eisenhower the Netherlands was the only country “out of line” and “causing trouble.”<sup>341</sup>

#### Dutch response to the areas of major change within NATO

With Dutch interests in mind the Dutch government embarked on negotiations on the three areas of major change within NATO. The Netherlands fully supported the proposal of a unified command within NATO.<sup>342</sup> Minister Stikker thought it would have

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<sup>340</sup>Notes: Meeting of General Eisenhower with the President and Cabinet, January 31, 1951, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1951: Volume III, European Security and the German Question*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 452.

<sup>341</sup>Ibid., 455.

<sup>342</sup>Telegram: United States Special Representative in Europe (Katz) to Secretary of State, September 6, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 269.

a positive effect on confidence and morale.<sup>343</sup> This effect was essential as European morale was the weak. European countries, including the Netherlands started to lose faith in the ability to stop the communist hordes, because the United States had a hard time stopping the North Koreans and the Chinese in Korea.<sup>344</sup> The Dutch government was particularly happy with the appointment of General Eisenhower for they believed Eisenhower would re-instill morale.<sup>345</sup>

In the second area of major change the Dutch perspective is more obscure. Here the divergent perspectives of the political level and the military top officials become apparent. The choices of the Dutch government were largely driven by financial worries. This became apparent when the government decided to increase government spending on defense without increasing of the overall available budget.<sup>346</sup> The Dutch service chiefs had a lot of freedom to organize their service, as long as they adhered to NATO plans and stayed within budget. The budget allocation for the armed forces became the most

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<sup>343</sup>United States Delegation Minutes of the first meeting of the sixth Session of the North Atlantic Treaty Council, December 18, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 591.

<sup>344</sup>Telegram: Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to Secretary of State, August 8, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 191.

<sup>345</sup>United States Delegation Minutes of the first meeting of the sixth Session of the North Atlantic Treaty Council, December 18, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 591.

<sup>346</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 83.

important tool of controlling the military.<sup>347</sup> The government would only object if the plans did increase the financial burden for the Netherlands, or increased the demands on the population. This drove the Dutch government's reluctance to increase the number of allotted divisions, and their unwillingness to extend the length of conscription. In particular the conscription issue, first brought forward in 1949, remained a source of disagreement between General Kruls and the Dutch government. In the perspective of the Dutch government there were two objections to the extension of conscription from twelve months to eighteen months. It would mean an increase of the financial burden, and it would put a higher demand on the population.<sup>348</sup>

Even within the government opinions between Foreign Minister Stikker and Prime Minister Drees were divergent. Prime Minister Drees believed that the Dutch armed forces would be of no real value in the event of a Soviet attack. Particularly he saw the army and its budget as some sort of "insurance premium" to keep connected with the United States' military might.<sup>349</sup> Therefore an increase in the budget and units would be a waste. Foreign Minister Stikker, on the other hand, believed that the Dutch should increase their contribution to make the collaborative effort work.<sup>350</sup> The telegram from Acheson indicated that the United States was aware of this challenge. Although a different point of view existed between both politicians, Minister Stikker believed that he

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<sup>347</sup> Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 35.

<sup>348</sup> Kruls, *Request to HMS the Queen Juliana*, April 2, 1949.

<sup>349</sup> Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 35.

<sup>350</sup> Telegram: Secretary of State to certain Diplomatic Offices, July 26, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 142.

was the only one capable of convincing Prime Minister Drees to change his mind about the Dutch contribution to NATO.<sup>351</sup>

The Dutch perspective really shifted after the visit of General Eisenhower as the new SACEUR on January 10, 1951. When General Eisenhower made his disappointment public it damaged the image of the Netherlands as a loyal and credible partner. This public embarrassment drove the Dutch willingness to alter their plans. Ultimately the Dutch government decided to increase the Defense budget considerably, extend the conscription from twelve to eighteen months, and promised two additional divisions.<sup>352</sup> Based on percentage of GDP, the Dutch defense budget ranked the fifth largest budget within NATO.<sup>353</sup> In the period from 1950 to 1951 the defense budget became the largest position of the Dutch National budget, and it would remain that way until 1959.<sup>354</sup> Although General Eisenhower's visit resulted in the firing of General Kruls, the Dutch government basically adopted his plan for five divisions and eighteen months of conscription.

In case of the third area of major change the Dutch government had a clear objective. This objective had less to do with the future membership of Turkey and

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<sup>351</sup>Telegram: Secretary of State to certain Diplomatic Offices, July 28, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 151.

<sup>352</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 30.

<sup>353</sup>Memorandum by Director of International Security Affairs (Cabot) to Secretary of State, March 27, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1951: Volume III, European Security and the German question*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 104.

<sup>354</sup>Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 82.

Greece, but more with the debate on German rearmament and possible membership. Research on both primary and secondary sources at hand did not provide any insight in the Dutch perspective concerning these two countries. The only matter that seemed to link to the admittance of Greece and Turkey was the objections the Dutch government had on deciding these matters within just the big three, while such a decision would impact the entire alliance.<sup>355</sup>

On the question whether Germany ought to be brought into the alliance, the Dutch government did have a specific opinion. Although the occupation of the Netherlands had been just as bad as within the other European countries, the Dutch government made it perfectly clear that it was willing to consider German rearmament and membership.<sup>356</sup> In a telephone conversation between the United States' Special Representative in Europe, Milton Katz, and Minister Stikker, on September 6, 1950 Minister Stikker had already told Katz that the Dutch government was not just willing to consider, but was simply in favor of German membership.<sup>357</sup> To the Dutch government there were four reasons to support the United States in their effort to get Germany accepted into NATO. First of all, and most importantly, German membership would mean that the entire Dutch territory

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<sup>355</sup> Memorandum of conversation, by special assistant to the Secretary of State (Battle), September 14, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 1231.

<sup>356</sup> Telegram: Secretary of State to the acting Secretary of State, September 16, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 313.

<sup>357</sup> Telegram: United States Representative in Europe (Katz) to secretary of State, September 6, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 269.

would be behind the defensive line.<sup>358</sup> Second of all, German membership would spread the burden of collective defense over more countries, not allowing Germany to economically rebuild without having to commit to defense at all. Third, the Dutch saw German membership as a healthy development to balance French domination on the continent. This was particularly important since both the United Kingdom and the United States had not yet committed to sending large ground forces to the continent.<sup>359</sup> Finally the Dutch government thought it would link the United States more closely with the European continent.<sup>360</sup> Because the German membership advanced Dutch national interest the matter provided an opportunity to side with the United States.

### Conclusions

The Netherlands had national interests that shaped their perspective on NATO during the Korean War. The Dutch government did not see the outbreak of the Korean War as proof of an imminent Soviet led communist attack on Western Europe. This combined with an absolute preference for the continuation of economic recovery drove the government's unwillingness to increase the military capacity and production in 1950. The Dutch government could not simply ignore all demands of NATO, and in particular the United States. The Dutch government wanted to be a credible partner. Finally, the Dutch government wanted to secure a larger role for the Netherlands Navy, and get the

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<sup>358</sup> Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 75.

<sup>359</sup> Memorandum of conversation, by assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins), November 29, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Volume III, Western Europe*, edited by Everett Gleason (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), 500.

<sup>360</sup> Hoffenaar and Schoenmaker, *Met de Blik naar het Oosten*, 75.

actual line of defense as far to the East as possible. These interests shaped the perspective on the creation of NATO's high command under General Eisenhower. The Dutch government supported this development. The Dutch government also supported the expansion of NATO with Greece and Turkey. Since an expansion with Germany would shift the defensive line to the East, and therefore directly meet the interest of the Netherlands, it could count on Dutch support. The biggest hurdle for the Dutch government was the actual increase of NATO's force structure, and the Dutch military contribution. The creation of two additional divisions and the extension of conscription remained opposed by the government. General Eisenhower's visit, as the new SACEUR, finally resulted in additional pressure on the Dutch government. This additional pressure eventually changed the Dutch perspective. In March 1951 the Dutch government decided to increase the defense budget substantially, create two additional divisions, and lengthen conscription.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

#### Introduction

This thesis provides insight into the reactions to security dilemmas of both the United States and the Netherlands in the 1945-1952 timeframe. It provides a Dutch perspective on the development of NATO and the significance of the Korean War. Although this thesis is descriptive in nature it may contribute to understanding how the Dutch viewed collective security. This knowledge is can be valuable for understanding contemporary Dutch defense and foreign policy. To find an answer to the question what the Dutch perspective on the development of NATO during the Korean War was, there are a number of research questions that need to be answered. These research questions are:

1. What are the world shaping events in the security domain during 1945-1950?
2. What was the Dutch perspective on the development of NATO before the outbreak of the Korean WAR?
3. What was the significance of the Korean War for the development of NATO?
4. What was the Dutch perspective on the development of NATO during the Korean WAR?

#### Summary

Between 1945 and 1950 a pattern developed that fed the growth of mistrust between the Soviet led Communist block and United States' led Capitalist block. In 1947 the United States believed that the best way towards containment was mainly economic

and diplomatic focused. This was mainly based on George Kennan's account on the nature of Soviet behavior. This belief slowly eroded as the Soviet Union demonstrated to be an untrustworthy partner in the international arena. Events in 1949 seemed to be pivotal to create a sense of urgency if the United States and its allies wished to survive and uphold democracy and capitalism. In 1949 the United States learned that the proclamation of the Truman doctrine was not enough to safeguard China against the fall to communism. In that same year the Soviet Union exploded their first atomic bomb, four years ahead of estimated timelines. At that time it looked like the United States and its allies were about to lose the race against the spread of communism.

The loss of nuclear monopoly in combination with the loss of China drove the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department to create a new report that would influence future foreign and security policy of the United States. In April 1950 the NSC presented their report NSC 68. This document suggested to shift the previous, primarily diplomatic and economic focus towards a more military focus. Instead of portraying the Soviet Union as war weary and only interested in its own defense, NSC 68 described the Soviet Union as expansionist with a large conventional and now also nuclear capability.<sup>361</sup> NSC 68 recommended a substantial increase in military expenditure, economic assistance to allies, increase of taxes, and a priority of military programs over non-military programs. Failing to act would place the United States in grave danger.<sup>362</sup> The economic recovery was not quick enough to stabilize all European nations, and safeguard them against

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<sup>361</sup>Excerpts from NSC-68 (Report to the President, April 7, 1950), *The Cold War: A History through documents*, edited by Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1999), 66.

<sup>362</sup>Ibid.

communism. To make things worse the Dutch and French were trying to regain control of their colonies in SEA, only making those areas more receptive to communism. These conditions formed the United States' paradigm when the Korean War surprised the world.

The Dutch perspective on the development of NATO prior to the outbreak of the Korean War was influenced by several elements. The experience of defeat during World War II ensured that both political and the military officials concluded that collective defense was the only viable option for the Netherlands. The Dutch Government, fully aware of the tension between communism and capitalism, saw collective defense as a necessity.<sup>363</sup> Therefor the Netherlands became founding a members of both the WU and NATO.

What membership of the WU and NATO actually meant proved to be a source of tension for the Netherlands and the Dutch Armed Forces. The government's decision to give the reestablishment of control in the Dutch East Indies priority over the reestablishment of European defense forces formed a source of tension between the Netherlands and its Allies. This potentially could lead to an unbalanced contribution within the WU and later NATO. The amount and quality of troops that the Netherlands had to commit was the subject of a dispute between the Chief of General Staff, General Kruls, and the government. General Kruls did not agree on the level of quality the troops would have with the limited conscription time. The government on the other hand tried to raise the required divisions within financial means.

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<sup>363</sup>Honig, *Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance*, 11.

Another major interest of the Netherlands was the amount of Dutch territory that would be defended in the event of a Soviet Union attack. This was always a concern for the Dutch government. Field Marshal Montgomery would not defend the Rhine-Ijssel line if, the Dutch government did not make a full contribution to the WU. This helped persuade the Dutch government to agree on committing three divisions of troops to the WU defense plans.

A final matter that impacted on the Dutch perception of NATO prior to the outbreak of the Korean War was the role that both the WU and NATO attributed the Dutch navy. Both the WU and NATO argued for a minesweeping role within the North Sea, whereas the Dutch preferred a more prestigious Blue water role on the Atlantic Ocean. This matter remained a source of tension between the Netherlands and the WU, and later NATO.

The outbreak of the Korean War shaped the Western perception of the security situation of the free world. It confirmed the pattern of mistrust that had steadily grown since the end of World War II. It confirmed the United States' perception of Soviet intended expansion of communism. The Korean War started and drove NATO's transition from a merely political organization to a more mature defense organization. The transition to a more mature organization concerned three major areas within NATO. The first area concerned the development of NATO's high command structure with the installation of General Eisenhower as the first SACEUR. The second area concerned the establishment of defense forces with increased numbers of divisions to be ready by 1954. The third area concerned the enlargement of NATO, with Turkey and Greece as new members. The Korean War also opened the discussions about further enlargement with

Spain and Germany. Especially the utilization and rearmament of Germany proved to be constant issue until Germany became a member in 1955.

### Conclusion

National interests shaped the Dutch perspective on NATO development during the Korean War. For the Dutch government the outbreak of the Korean War did not automatically prove that a Soviet led communist attack on Western Europe was imminent. This combined with an absolute preference for the continuation of economic recovery drove the government's unwillingness to increase the military capacity and production in 1950. It was in the Dutch interest to be a credible partner, especially to the United States. This meant that the Dutch government could not simply ignore NATO's demands. Next to being a credible partner the Dutch had two other important interests. The Dutch wanted to count as a medium naval power within NATO, and needed an ocean going role for the Dutch navy. Accepting the Netherlands as a member of the Atlantic Working Group opened the door to this ocean going role. The final Dutch interest was to get the actual line of defense as far to the East as possible.

These interests shaped the perspective on the creation of NATO high command under General Eisenhower. The Dutch government supported this development. The Dutch government also supported the expansion of NATO with Greece and Turkey. The Dutch welcomed the discussion about future German membership, although the Netherlands had also suffered under German occupation during World War II. German Membership would shift the defensive line to the East, and therefore directly meet Dutch national interest.

The actual increase of NATO's force structure, and the Dutch military's contribution formed the biggest hurdle for the Dutch government. The Dutch government remained opposed to provide two additional divisions, and extend conscription to eighteen months. General Eisenhower's visit, as the new SACEUR, in January 1950 resulted in additional pressure on the Dutch government. The Dutch government did not want to risk a deterioration of the relationship with the United States, and changed their perspective. In March 1951 the Dutch government decided to increase the defense budget substantially, create two additional divisions, and lengthen conscription, thus firmly entrenching the Netherlands into NATO.

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